Seniority, Information and Electoral Accountability

Rodet, Cortney Stephen (2013): Seniority, Information and Electoral Accountability.

Abstract

This paper addresses the impact information has on electoral accountability in a legislative system based on seniority using laboratory experiments. A purely rational choice perspective of a simple voting environment implies that information is inconsequential when seniority is exceptionally valuable. Seniority advantage presents the opportunity to shirk at the expense of voters. I contrast the rational choice perspective to behavioral considerations of trust, betrayal and expectations. Voter information about incumbent behavior is varied across experimental treatments, and I find that information leads to accountability when voters can compare their own incumbent’s behavior to the behavior of others. Moreover, information deters incumbent shirking.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: voting, experiments, information, seniority, principal-agent
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D89 - Other

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