Pollock, Rufus (2007): Forever Minus a Day? Some Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright.
Download (274Kb) | Preview
The optimal level for copyright has been a matter for extensive debate over the last decade. This paper contributes several new results on this issue divided into two parts. In the first, a parsimonious theoretical model is used to prove several novel propositions about the optimal level of protection. Specifically, we demonstrate that (a) optimal copyright is likely to fall as the production costs of `originals' decline (for example as a result of digitization) and that (b) the optimal level of copyright will, in general, fall over time. The second part of the paper focuses on the specific case of copyright term. Using a simple model we characterise optimal term as a function of a few key parameters. We estimate this function using a combination of new and existing data on recordings and books and find an optimal term of around fifteen years. This is substantially shorter than any current copyright term and implies that existing copyright terms are too long.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Forever Minus a Day? Some Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright|
|Keywords:||Copyright; Intellectual Property; Copyright Term; Technological Change|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights > O34 - Intellectual Property Rights
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - General
|Depositing User:||Rufus Pollock|
|Date Deposited:||24. Sep 2007|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 04:59|
George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald Coase, Linda R. Cohen, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W. Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, C. Scott Hemphill, Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, Richard L. Schmalensee, Steven Shavell, Hal R. Varian, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. The copyright term extension act of 1998: An economic analysis, 5 2002.
David Blackburn. Online piracy and recorded music sales, 12 2004. Job Market Paper (Harvard PhD Programme).
Michele Boldrin and David Levine. IP and market size. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 618897000000000836, UCLA Department of Economics, July 2005.
Tim Brooks. Survey of reissues of us recordings, 2005. URL http://www.clir.org/pubs/abstract/pub133abst.html. Copublished by the Council on Library and Information Resources and the Library of Congress.
CIPIL. Review of the economic evidence relating to an extension of the term of copyright in sound recordings, 12 2006. Prepared for the Gowers Review on Intellectual Property.
William Cornish and David Llewelyn. Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Al lied Rights. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 5th edition, 2003.
F. Deschatres and D. Sornette. The dynamics of book sales: Endogenous versus exogenous shocks in complex networks, December 2004.
A. Ghose, M.D. Smith, and R. Telang. Internet exchanges for used books: An empirical analysis of product cannibalization and welfare impact, 2004.
Austan Goolsbee and Judith Chevalier. Measuring prices and price competition online: Amazon and barnes and noble, July 2002. NBER Working Papers.
Kai-Lung Hui and I. P. L. Png. On the supply of creative work: Evidence from the movies. American Economic Review, 92(2):217–220, May 2002.
William Johnson. The economics of copying. Journal of Political Economy, 93(1):158–174, 1985.
William Landes and Richard Posner. An economic analysis of copyright law. Journal of Legal Studies, 18(2):325–363, 1989.
William Landes and Richard Posner. Indefinitely renewable copyright. University of Chicago Law Review, 70(471), 2003.
Fabrice Le Guel and Fabrice Rochelandet. P2p music-sharing networks: Why legal fight against copiers may be inefficient?, Oct 2005.
Stan Liebowitz. Copying and indirect appropriability: Photocopying of journals. Journal of Political Economy, 93(5):945–957, 1985.
Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis. Seventeen famous economists weigh in on copyright: The role of theory, empirics, & network effects. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 18(2), 2005.
Ian Novos and Michael Waldman. The effects of increased copyright protection: An analytic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 92(2):236–246, 1984.
Felix Oberholzer and Koleman Strumpf. The effect of file sharing on record sales: An empirical analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 115(1):1–42, 2007.
Martin Peitz and Patrick Waelbroeck. Why the music industry may gain from free down- loading – the role of sampling. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(5): 907–913, September 2006.
Ivan Png. Copyright: A plea for empirical research. Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 3(2):3–13, 2006.
Ivan Png and Qiu hong Wang. Copyright duration and the supply of creative work. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 321307000000000478, UCLA Department of Econom- ics, January 2007.
E. Rappaport. Copyright term extension: Estimating the economic values. Technical report, Congressional Research Service, May 1998.
Rafael Rob and Joel Waldfogel. Piracy on the high c’s: Music downloading, sales dis- placement, and social welfare in a sample of college students, 2004.
Nancy L. Stokey, Jr. Lucas Robert E., and Edward C. Prescott. Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics. Harvard University Press, October 1989. ISBN 0674750969.
Richard Watt. Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes? Edward Elgar, Chel- tenham, UK, 2000.