Beard, Rodney and Mallawaarachchi, Thilak and Salerno, Gillian (2007): Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality.
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In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||University of Alberta|
|Original Title:||Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality|
|Keywords:||Game theory; public choice; imperfect public monitoring; imperfect private monitoring; non-point source pollution; agricultural extension and public education|
|Subjects:||Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q1 - Agriculture
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Rodney Beard|
|Date Deposited:||17. Oct 2007|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 06:11|