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A corrigendum to "Games with imperfectly observable actions in continuous time"

Hashimoto, Tadashi (2007): A corrigendum to "Games with imperfectly observable actions in continuous time".

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Abstract

Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2) needs some corrections. I show that the main theorem holds as it is with suitable modifications of Lemmata 5 and 6.

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