The duration of bank relationships and the performance of Tunisian firms

Hakimi, Abdelaziz and Hamdi, Helmi (2013): The duration of bank relationships and the performance of Tunisian firms. Published in: Journal of Applied Business Research , Vol. 30, No. 01/2014. , p 59-64 (2014): pp. 59-64.

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the link between the duration of bank relationships and its consequences on the performance of Tunisian firms. Performance is measured by the return on equity (ROE) and the return on Assets (ROA). We collected data of 100 Tunisian companies for the period of 2000-2007. Applying panel data estimation, our results opine that the cost of credit decreases the performance of Tunisian firms while the duration of bank relationships improves their performance and increase their profitability.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bank relationships, Tunisia, Panel Data
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - General

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