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On Stable Equilibria in Discrete-Space Social Interaction Models

Akamatsu, Takashi and Fujishima, Shota and Takayama, Yuki (2014): On Stable Equilibria in Discrete-Space Social Interaction Models.

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Abstract

We investigate the differences and connections between discrete-space and continuous-space social interaction models. Although our class of continuous-space model has a unique equilibrium, we find that discretized models can have multiple equilibria for any degree of discretization, which necessitates a stability analysis of equilibria. We present a general framework for characterizations of equilibria and their stability under a broad class of evolutionary dynamics by using the properties of a potential game. Although the equilibrium population distribution in the continuous space is uniquely given by a symmetric unimodal distribution, we find that such a distribution is not always stable in a discrete space. On the other hand, we also show that any sequence of a discrete-space model's equilibria converges with the continuous-space model's unique equilibrium as the discretization is refined.

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