Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism

Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth (2007): The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism. Forthcoming in:

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_5825.pdf

Download (263kB) | Preview

Abstract

We take a garden-variety instance of distributive politics-- a divide-the-cake stage game -- and explore dynamic extensions in different institutional settings: (i) repeated play of the stage game in a simultaneous-term unicameral legislature; (ii) repeated play in a staggered-term unicameral legislature; and (iii)repeated play in a bicameral setting of one staggered-term and one simultaneous-term legislative chamber. We are then able to entertain decisions taken at "the constitutional moment" regarding which institutional forms to employ.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.