No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems

Gomez-Rua, Maria and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2006): No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Unpublished.

Abstract

In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This property implies that no group of agents can be better off claiming to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satisfies this property. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using No Advantageous Merging.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problems; cost sharing; Bird rule; No Advantageous Merging
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References

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