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Promoting Competition or Helping Less-Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality

Kamei, Kenju (2014): Promoting Competition or Helping Less-Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality.

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Abstract

With heterogeneous endowments, subjects collectively choose between a lottery contest, where only one individual in a group receives an award, and a public good which benefits the less-endowed more. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of the subjects vote for the public good regardless of the award size in the contest. Also, the subjects’ average risk preferences don’t differ by voter type. Furthermore, their payoffs, whether ex-ante expected payoffs based on beliefs or ex-post payoffs, are more equally distributed in the public good regime. These suggest that people’s collective institutional choices may be driven by inequality-averse concerns in our context.

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