A unified differential information framework assessing that more information is preferred to less

Fugarolas Álvarez-Ude, Guadalupe and Hervés-Beloso, Carlos (2005): A unified differential information framework assessing that more information is preferred to less. Unpublished.

Abstract

The Walrasian model has played a central role in all aspects of economics. The purpose of this paper is to propose a general modeling of differential information in the spirit of the Arrow-Debreu model and following the Radner tradition but away from the usual measurability conception. We provide a characterization of better informed agents in order to firstly formalize an essential feature known as part of some oral tradition: a decisionmaker prefers more information to less.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Uncertainty; differential information; information sets; informational feasibility and better informed agents
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools; D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D50 - General

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