Are women in the MENA region really that different from women in Europe? Globalization, conservative values and female labor market participation.

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Are women in the MENA region really that different from women in Europe? Globalization, conservative values and female labor market participation

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to compare women in the MENA region with women in Europe as to how globalization affects their conservative values and attitudes, and, thereby, their labor market participation. The authors define conservative values as both religious values and socio-political attitudes relating to family issues and leadership. Using micro data from the World Values Survey covering over 80 countries between 1981 and 2014, we employ three distinct indicators of globalization that reflect, first, international trade, and, second, cross-national flows of information via persons and media. In Western Europe, during the Cold War period economic globalization appears to weaken those conservative values that directly pertain to female labor market participation, mirroring the current development in the MENA countries. After the Cold War, in Western Europe all remaining secular-conservative values appear equally weakened by international trade, possibly predicting changes to come in the MENA region. Eastern Europe appears distinct from the other two regions. In the MENA region, women respond to intensifying economic globalization with deeper religiosity, possibly as a manifestation of self-protection. Global exchange of information, however, weakens all kinds of conservative values in general in either region. For both MENA countries and Europe likewise, women who are more conservative are less likely to participate in the labor market. Overall, this study suggests that economic globalization transforms not only the economy but also those conservative values that present an obstacle to gainful employment of women.

Keywords: Globalization, economic integration, media, female labor force participation, religion, conservative values, identity, MENA, Europe

JEL codes: C33, D83, F14, F16, F66, J16, J21, Z12, Z13

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1. INTRODUCTION

Globalization is a multi-facetted phenomenon whose dynamics and impact on the economy and particularly on the society are still not fully understood. Globalization exerts effects not only on the economy and the environment, but also on cultures, social and political systems, and human well-being. Although the debate has focused on mostly economic effects such as unemployment, growth and income inequality, the impact of globalization on values and cultural attitudes are very important with broader economic and social consequences. In our contribution, we draw a distinction between economic integration into world markets of goods and informational integration into world 'markets' of information flows.

This chapter aims to make a contribution to our understanding of the social effects of globalization through the values channel. People's values are shaped by a number of factors including customs, traditions and the importance one attaches to religion. First, the chapter aims to investigate how globalization affects women's religious conservative values (religious belief and religiosity) and socio-political conservative attitudes. We then investigate how conservative values affect female employment. This way, we aim to contribute to the existing literature by extending the discussion on religion/values-female employment nexus to the role of globalization as a transmission mechanism. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions in the empirical analysis:

1. Does globalization change women's values, specifically their degree of conservatism?

2. Through this value change, does globalization impact female employment? That is, do these values and attitudes impact women's labor market participation decisions?

Second, the chapter aims to answer the question whether women in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), who are mostly Muslims, are different from women in Europe, who are mostly Christians, in their reactions to the forces of globalization. The empirical analysis is based on 428'000 responses from the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted in over 80 countries between 1981 and 2014.

In general, it appears that those societal changes globalization triggers nowadays in the MENA countries resemble the changes that Western Europe underwent during the Cold War period prior to1995. In light of this finding, the developments in Western Europe observed from 1995 on might predict future societal changes in the MENA countries for the years to come. It becomes

also apparent that Eastern Europe, shaped by Communism and a regaining Orthodox-Christianism, is very much distinct from Western Europe and the MENA region likewise.

Specifically, economic globalization that takes place in the MENA region tends to foster adherence to conservative-religious values, and socio-political conservative values in general. Only conservative values directly pertaining to labor market participation (e.g., girl's education and importance of family) are weakened as MENA countries economically globalize, possibly reflecting an adjustment of women's values to the transforming forces of economic integration and the new economic necessities that arise in the region. While a similar development of weakening of these secular conservative values alone is also observable for Western Europe prior to 1995, from 1995 on it appears that economic globalization had been destructive also to all remaining tested facets of women's secular conservatism in Western Europe. Overall, the destruction of conservative and traditional values appears contagious.

Globalization of information through media and the internet tends to make people more critical toward religion-based and secular conservative values – this is observable in both regions and all time periods under investigation likewise. In contrast, in the MENA countries, cross-cultural personal contacts e.g. through tourism and seasonal work appear to foster adherence to religious values.

Finally, regarding female employment, religious values and socio-political conservative values appear to decrease the probability of female employment, for all three regions investigated. In this respect, women in the MENA region are similar to women in Western and Eastern Europe. Also active membership in religious groups and a high frequency of service attendance – expressing adhering to religious values in a formal way – reduces labor market participation. The restrictive influence of conservative-secular and conservative-religious values on female employment is found to be stable over the last 30 years.

The findings of this study bear an important implication for socio-economic policy making in the MENA region. Economic globalization appears to trigger an automatism and dynamics that ultimately leads to increased women's labor market participation: the forces of global economic integration trigger a change in women's conservative values that bear a direct relation to their labor market decision and, this way, they tend to positively affect female labor market participation. Information available through the internet and media appears to add to this effect.

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Obviously, non-conservative politicians wishing a stronger integration of women in their domestic labor markets simply need to open up their economy and society towards outside flows of goods and information.

Table O: Overview and guide to regression Tables 1 through 14.

Region	MENA	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Regression tables
Adherence to….	Religious values			
Economic globalization	+	x	+	1, 2
Personal contacts	-/+	x	x	
Informational globalization	-/+	x	x	
	Confidence in religious organization			
Economic globalization	+	x	x	4
Personal contacts	+	x	x	
Informational globalization	-	-	-	
	Conservative secular values (family, education of girls)			
Economic globalization	-	-	x	7, 8, 9
Personal contacts	x	-	+	
Informational globalization	x	+	-	
	< 1995			
	Other conservative secular values (divorce, abortion)			7, 8, 9
Economic glob.	+	-	-	
Personal Contacts	+	x	x	
Informational globalization	-	x	-	
	> 1994			
	Labor market participation of women			
	MENA	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	
Religious values (Tables 1, 2)	-	-	-	10
Confidence (Tables 1, 2)	-	-	-	10
Conservative values (family, education) (Tables 7, 8, 9)	-	-	-	13
Conservative values (divorce, abortion) (Tables 7, 8, 9)	-	-	-	13
Active membership (Table 6)	x	-	-	12

Note: + and – denote positive (increasing) and negative (decreasing) impacts, respectively. x denotes no significant impact.

The structure of this contribution is as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 describes our novel hypotheses and describes empirical literature on the values/female labor force participation interaction. Section 3 provides definitions of globalization and female conservatism and presents the data. This is followed by the empirical analysis for the MENA region and Europe (Section 4). The last section 5 discusses the findings and concludes the chapter. Table O provides a non-numerical overview of our findings in Tables 1 through 14.

2. BACKGROUND: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

2.1. How does globalization affect values?

Human behavior, as classical economic theory assumes, is determined by two distinct features: individual's 'preferences' and the 'restrictions' she faces. Preferences are commonly called attitudes and values by non-economists: for example, a conservative political attitude might imply preferring economic growth over income redistribution, or, for conservatively-minded women, preferring caring for family members over earning income in the labor market. Typical restrictions individuals face include one's household budget (income/wage), but also other restrictions imposed by society such as governmental institutions and social norms.

Globalization – the growing cross-country interaction and integration of people, companies, and governments – is a process that started in the 16th century with the development of fast cargo ships, lowering the costs of overseas transportation so that frequent and long-distance trade with daily goods such as food and cloths became affordable. Long-distance exchange of goods was also accompanied by the exchange of information. The 19th century was not only shaped by new techniques of over-seas communication such as telegraph lines but also by mass immigration of Europeans and Asians into the 'new world'. Hence, globalization is not restricted to international trade and cross-national investments in a narrow sense. Globalization also includes the continuing movement of people across countries, be it as workers but also as tourists, the cross-national exchange of information, be it through personal contacts or means of modern information technology.

From a socio-psychological perspective, globalization implies that the distinction between 'here' and 'there', between 'inside' the society and 'outside' the society, between 'local' and 'global' becomes blurred: technological progress has caused a shrinking of previously decisive distances - not only geographic ones, but also social ones. In consequence, locally generated developments have an impact not only locally but also worldwide. Illustrating recent examples of what globalization means for ordinary people, one can include the breakdown of the US housing market that ultimately triggered a worldwide financial market crisis affecting almost all countries. Wars in the Middle East also spill over to European societies, leading to ethnic conflicts and unrests among their residents. Another example is the outbreak of Ebola and other similar diseases that emerge in developing countries and easily travel on trade and tourism routes into developed countries. Globalization also implies that critical information created in the Western hemisphere cannot be prevented from entering and diffusing into autocratic countries such as pre-2012 Egypt, fueling local people's demand for political change. Regarding the impact of economic and informational globalization on women's values and identity we have identified a theoretical and empirical research gap.

In this article, we postulate that the process of globalization challenges one's own political views and values and might lead to their revision (Fischer, 2012; 2015). Through these changes in values and attitudes, globalization may ultimately affect people's behavior in the economic and social sphere. Globalization might alter one's values and attitudes through differing channels: first, through the global exchange of information, and, second, more indirectly through global trade.

Our first hypothesis is that global information is used for up-dating priors – new information leads possibly to a revision of ones' beliefs and social or political attitudes. More precisely, we conjecture that the global exchange of information leads to an updating and a revision of one's own beliefs: be it through mass media, the internet or through personal contacts during travel, informational globalization always involves getting information on foreign governance structures, different ways of organizing the local economy, foreign culture, differing historical experiences (Fischer, 2012). For example, in Egypt, growing knowledge about democratic governance structure in Europe might have led to a revision by young Egyptians of how they evaluate their own political system. In the specific case of conservatism, gaining knowledge about liberal societies in other parts of the world and the challenges these societies might impose

on young people might lead to a revision of one's own political and social views, making one either more paternalistic-conservative or more liberal.

Our second hypothesis uses the idea that endogenous and continuously changing preferences are affected also by changes in the socio-economic environment in which they emerge. More specifically, international trade and foreign investment transform the local economy by generating disproportional sectoral growth, creating new industries of international specialization and economic opportunities. We postulate that this (changing) economic environment influences people's views and attitudes: Economic globalization alters people's values and attitudes through its effect on the domestic economy, to which their preferences finally (need to) adapt.

We conjecture that women' social and political attitudes can, in principle, react in two opposite ways: they might evolve either in opposition to these economic changes or in a way that supports them. Expressed differently, globalization might make women's preferences more 'labor-market-friendly' supporting the underlying economic transformation – or, on the opposite, globalization might make women's preferences more conservative, more religious, more 'family-oriented', opposing the changes in the domestic economy. Our empirical analysis aims to investigate which of these two possible reactions of preferences to economic globalization prevails in the MENA region and Europe.

2.2. How do values shape female labor force participation?

Women's values shape their economic decisions through their identity, a person's sense of self. Akerlof and Kranton (2000), in their pioneering work on the identity economics approach, argue that the choice of identity by individuals may be the most important economic decision because identity is central to behavior, and limits imposed on this choice may directly affect one's economic wellbeing.[1] From a gender point of view, it is argued that women will have lower labor force attachment than men if their identity is enhanced by work at home. Accordingly, women's movement is said to increase female labor force participation by reshaping societal notions of femininity and the link between gender and tasks, hence redefining women's identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Based on this theoretical framework, we argue that globalization is expected to influence female labor force attachment by reshaping women's identity and the importance they attach to it.

It is important to understand the factors that affect identity as it directly influences behavior, it. Two key factors are cultural tradition and religion (Turner & Reynolds, 2010; cited by (Hayo & Caris, 2013). Both cultural tradition and religion bear direct gendered labor market implications by influencing men's and women's perception about gender division of labor at home and in the labor market. In a formal game-theoretic framework, Hayo and Caris (2013) show for women who socialized in a traditional family environment that working in the labor market leads to a greater loss in their female identity, negatively affecting their labor market participation.

The impact of religion as a key determinant of identity and thus of gender equality and women's socioeconomic status has long been the subject of literature especially in sociology. Religion affects women's labor force participation because different religions have different life styles and different attitude toward gender roles and fertility behavior (Lehrer, 1995). In all religions, conservative groups believe that women should focus on building a virtuous home and upbringing their children while men should take on the role of main breadwinner and final decision-making authority (Hawley, 1994; cited by Glass, 2006). However, some scholars argue that conservative religious groups are expected to have little effect on women's behavioral choices due to the diverse thinking and tolerance in these groups as well as strong economic incentives and constraints being faced (Glass & Nath, 2006). There is also evidence that traditional attitudes of women are shaped in their youth and negatively influence women's human capital investment and their labor supply (Vella, 1994).

Particularly the role of Islam in explaining the status of women in the MENA region has been an old debate. While some scholars attribute this outcome to Islam itself, others argue that it is not Islam itself but high levels of personal religiosity common in Islamic societies that leads to less gender egalitarian societies in the MENA region (Price, 2011). Going beyond Islam, no one religion stands out as consistently more gender inequitable than others, and higher religiosity, the intensity of belief, itself is associated with less egalitarian gender ideology after controlling for a country's religion and individual religious affiliation in all religions (Seguino, 2011). Moreover, there appears to be reversed causality in the relation between culture/attitudes and female labor force participation; however, the latter affects the former with a lag (Seguino, 2007).

National modernization policies have also had an influence on the status of women in the MENA region; specifically, the introduction of state-led modernization programs financed to a great

extent with oil export wealth impacted the whole society in MENA countries. This process of modernization together with pressing political and economic realities made women's social mobility less limited (Haghighat, 2012). Modernization theory and development economics claim that transition from preindustrial agricultural economy to an early industrial urban economy and later to a post-industrial economy has a U-shaped effect on female labor force participation: With the transition to an urban, industrial economy, women's participation in the labor market declines with the physical separation of work and home life, which were taking place together in the agricultural economy. In the latter stage of post-industrialization, with increased education and reduced fertility together with more job opportunities, women's domestic responsibilities at home become less demanding and their participation in the labor market increases (Haghighat, 2012).

2.3. Empirical literature on female labor market participation in the MENA Region and Europe

Empirical economic studies on female labor force participation have mostly centered on the role of supply-side factors such as demographic, socio-economic and household characteristics while demand-side factors and job-related characteristics received less attention. Some studies investigate the role of policy-related factors such as labor market regime and care-related social policies, particularly in the European context. Feminist economists highlight the role of gendered division of labor, gendered labor markets and the role of care economy in shaping women's status in the labor market (Elson, 1995). Sociological studies put relatively more emphasis on the effect of gender attitudes and identity on female labor market attachment. This section presents an overview of major findings with a particular attention to the role of values and religion in understanding female labor force participation in MENA countries.

In developing countries economic integration led to a feminization of labor force through the expansion of labor-intensive production and flexible forms of employment (Standing, 1989; Standing, 1999). This demand-driven process of feminization in the labor market is observable for the manufacturing industries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Syria, and Yemen, driven by private foreign ownership, exporting activities, and gender equality politics (Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015) (see Fischer, 2015, for a literature overview on employment effects in MENA countries). However, this process has been weak in the MENA region with an average

female labor force participation rate of 25%, well below the worldwide average of 50%. This regional disparity is especially puzzling when one considers that the MENA region recorded the fastest growth in Human Development Index since the 1970s, achieving gender parity in secondary school enrolment rates and even higher enrollment rates for girls at universities (World Bank, 2013). One possible explanation is that male laborers set free in the contracting sector enter the (formerly female labor-intensive) exporting sector, decreasing female employment in this expanding sector of the economy (Fischer, 2015). Another explanation is the shrinking public sector serving as traditional female-worker employer that increased the importance of private sector for women in the MENA region. Restrictions on mobility impact the choice of women, as do legal restrictions on women's work and political participation, the skill mismatch that is more severely faced by women than by men, as does employer discrimination against women as well as women's own concerns about their reputation and safety (World Bank, 2013). These restrictions emphasize the importance of cultural and religious factors in understanding the MENA context.

Investigating the impact of individual religiosity (i.e. adherence to religious values, intensity of belief, and participation in religious activities) on female labor force participation, (H'madoun, 2010) finds that there is a significant difference between religious and nonreligious women. Intensity of belief reduces the likelihood of employment while participation in religious activities increases it after controlling for individual and household characteristics. However, when country fixed-effects are introduced, these factors become insignificant highlighting the importance of country-specific institutional, economic and socio-political context. Moreover, the impact of religion on female labor force participation can be different across rural and urban areas. For example, in Malaysia, religion affects women's labor market attachment only in rural areas (Amin & Alam, 2008). In Turkey, it is documented that higher urbanization leads to higher conservatism which negatively affects female labor force participation (Goksel, 2013).[2]

Having a conservative-traditional attitude towards working women is shown to have a negative effect on female labor market participation in the case of Jordan's capital Amman (Chamlou, Muzi, & Ahmed, 2011). It is often not clear whether it is a particular religious faith itself or the historically dominant cultural environment that lies below these social norms limiting women's entry into labor market. Analyzing the relative importance of these two aspects of identity, Hayo and Caris (2013) find that Muslim women have a lower probability of working across all

countries while they have a higher probability of working compared to Arab women with non-Muslim religions. This finding is attributed to the more significant role of traditional cultural norms than religion itself in the MENA region. It is also documented that being a religious individual has a more detrimental effect on attitudes towards working women than living in a highly religious society (Price, 2011).

In OECD countries, the increase in female educational attainment, the expansion of service sector jobs and part-time employment, and the availability of childcare services are the three major factors that explain the rise in female labor force participation (Thévenon, 2013). Regarding the impact of economic and informational globalization across OECD countries, economic integration is found to increase the probability of women's employment at the national level, while the information dimension of globalization appears to change female labor force participation choices rather at the regional level (Fischer, 2015). In the case of European countries, labor market institutions and family-oriented policies caught significant attention as important factors in understanding the trends in female labor force participation. In a study covering 15 EU countries over the last 20 years, it is found that both labor market reforms towards a flexicure system and expansion of family-oriented policies explain the rise in female labor force participation particularly among young and highly educated women. The same study also finds that deregulatory labor market policies are effective in increasing women's employment only when supportive social policies are introduced (Cipollone, Patacchini, & Vallanti, 2014). The positive role of public childcare services on women's employment is also documented in a study covering 24 EU countries including the new member states in Eastern Europe (Erhel & Guergoat-Larivière, 2013).

Culture and particularly attitudes towards a woman's role in the family are reported as statistically and economically significant factors affecting women's employment for a panel of OECD countries, even after controlling for the role of policies, institutions and structural country characteristics (Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, & Serafinelli, 2013). Analyzing the specific role of religion for a cross-country analysis of 47 European countries, Pastore & Tenaglia (2013) find that belonging to the Orthodox, Catholic and, even more, Muslim denominations reduce the likelihood of employment for women while being a Protestant increases it. Interestingly, they find no difference between religiously active and non-active women for Orthodox and Muslim denominations while active women with Catholic or Protestant denominations tend to work less.

To the contrary, in the case of Germany, religious denomination is found to have a weak effect while women's regular participation in religious activities is found to have significant negative effect on women's labor force participation (Heineck, 2004). The negative effect of the strength of belief on women's employment is also documented for Sweden (Maneschiold & Haraldsson, 2007). These findings support the hypothesis that degree the degree of religiosity but not religion itself is important in influencing women's labor market attachment.

3. DATA AND DEFINITIONS

This article employs the World Values Survey (WVS) (1981-2014), collection of six repeated cross-sections of individual-level socio-demographic information collected in 81 countries. This survey also includes a set of questions that relates to attitudes and values. Out of the about 420'000 individuals those living in either MENA countries or Europe have been selected. For the empirical analysis, these are then matched at the country-year-level with indices of economic and informational globalization.

In the following we define and describe briefly the key notions and concepts used in the empirical analysis. In particular, we provide a) definitions of the MENA and Europe regions, b) definitions of economic and information globalization, c) a definition of 'traditional values', that is socio-political conservatism, including religiosity.

3.1. Definition of MENA region and Europe

There exist various definitions of the regions 'MENA' and 'Europe' – a cultural one, a political one, a geographic one, and a geo-strategic one, among others. In this chapter, the geographic definition is employed which defines 'Europe' as lying on the European continent, and 'MENA' as lying in the Northern African belt and Middle-East. I regard Turkey as lying in both regions, while Russia is counted as European as most Russians live in the European part, not on its Asian part.

Throughout this chapter, the following countries form the MENA region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The single waves of

the WVS vary with respect to the countries included. Out of the 20 MENA countries, only 15 are covered by the WVS 1981-2014, and the following countries are missing: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.

The following countries are considered as lying on the continent 'Europe': Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Herzegovina, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican state, Turkey, the United Kingdom. In the WVS 1981-2014, the small states Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican state as well as the large Russian-speaking country Belarus have never been included.

In the course of analysis, we will not only observe whether there are differences between MENA countries and European countries with respect to globalization effects. It is also important to draw a distinction between Western Europe and Eastern Europe because of their structural and historical differences. The geographic distinction between 'East' and 'West' will be drawn along the old Austrian-Hungarian empire and the German empire; all countries lying east to these empires are considered 'Eastern Europe'. The WVS includes Western European countries from its very start around 1981, but Eastern Europe and the MENA countries are covered only from the 1990s on. It was in 1990 that German unification took place, but it was in 1994 that the last Russian soldier left German ground, and it was in 1993 that the Czech Republic split up into two separate states, and it was in 1991 when Yugoslavia broke up into individual states. For this reason, the year 1994-1995 is chosen as the first year of the post-cold war world order.

3.2. Definitions of globalization

This chapter uses three definitions and measures of globalization: first, economic globalization through trade, second, globalization through international personal contacts, and third, information globalization through media and the internet.

Traditionally, economists have restricted globalization to integration of the national economy into the global markets – through international exchange of goods and services, flows of money through international financial markets, and foreign investment activities in the domestic

economy. This study employs an index of economic globalization developed by the Technical University of Zurich (KOF-ETH) (see Dreher et al., 2008) that measures a country's overall integration into the global economy; this index ranges from 0 to 100. The mean value of this index of economic globalization around 2010 is 61 points for the MENA region and 76 points for Europe (West: 81 points, East: 70 points) – the region MENA appears economically less globalized than Europe, but both regions are at very high levels of international integration.

The remaining two measures of globalization are related to the exchange of information - either in the virtual space or through personal contacts. There is a historical tradition of tradesmen not only to import foreign goods but also to bring news about alien and exotic countries, cultures and new political developments. For example, the merchant Marc Polo travelled from Italy to Asia and became an important source of information for contemporary Europeans on the Near East and China. Even today we can observe that international trade with goods and merchandise is accompanied by the flow of information across countries, via internet, other media, travel and tourism, or seasonal work in foreign countries. Measured by the index of overall informational globalization, also made available by the KOF-ETH, the correlation between economic globalization and informational globalization has a coefficient of 0.61 for the MENA countries and one of 0.76 for Europe. For both regions, exchanging merchandise and exchanging information appear to go hand in hand. The mean of overall informational globalization around 2010 is about 62 points in the MENA countries but 78 points in Europe, with 74 points reached in Eastern Europe and 83 points measured for Western Europe. In our empirical analysis, we employ the two subcomponents (each ranging from 0 to 100) of 'information through the virtual space' and 'information through personal contacts' separately. The first relates to information gained through travel, migration and tourism, while the second relates to information gained through media (TV, Newspapers) and the internet. Table A1 of the Appendix provides some descriptive statistics.

3.3. Definition of conservative-religious values

Information on people's values and attitudes in Europe and the MENA region and their socio-economic conditions (gender, age, employment status, etc.) are drawn from the WVS (WVS, 2014). The WVS was started in 1981 as an international cross-sectional survey that since then

collects such information roughly every five years until 2014; currently, about 420'000 persons from 81 countries are included. From each participating country, about 1000 persons are interviewed. There are about 236'000 individuals who reside in either the MENA region or Europe. The 20 MENA countries are represented by about 50'000 persons, of which most where interviewed in one of the last three waves, which is roughly from 1994 on. The WVS includes about 42 European countries with about 196'000 interviewees covered. Eastern Europeans have been included from the 3rd wave on. The empirical analysis is restricted to women only, who form about 50% of the interviewees. Table A1 of the Appendix provides some descriptive statistics.

This analysis employs various measures of different facets of 'conservatism' and 'conservative' values. First of all, conservatism is defined in terms of religious values and religiosity. Second, conservatism is defined in terms of social and political conservatism. To illustrate, a typical measure of a religious value is to 'think that god is important in one's life', while a typical measure of socio-political conservatism is to 'consider men more suitable for political leadership than women'. As we can see, socio-political conservatism is mostly related to adherence to the traditional role model which attributes to men the role of breadwinner and to women the role of household workers and childcare givers. Most of these measures of conservatism are of the categorical type. Those measures of conservatism were selected from the pool of WVS survey questions that are available for a sufficient number of survey waves and countries so that at the macro level a panel structure emerges. The single measures of conservatism used in this study will be presented in more detail during the course of empirical analysis.

4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Correlation Analysis: MENA countries

In any empirical analysis, it is important to look at simple relationships prior to applying more sophisticated statistical methods. We first present some exemplary correlations between globalization and religious values. Female population means are calculated for the MENA countries based on the responses to the question about the importance of religion as exemplary for religious values. The following scatter plots depict the measure of globalization on the horizontal axis and on the vertical axis the population mean based on female respondents'

answers to the question 'how important is religion in your life'.[3] Measures of globalization include economic globalization and informational globalization via media and the internet, and international personal contacts through travel and tourism. In all figures, the thin red line indicates the correlation between the globalization indices and the religiosity of the female population. These correlations are based on 27 country-year observations (based on 13 countries from the MENA region).

The scatter plots show that intensifying integration into world markets is correlated with a higher degree of religiosity in the female population in the MENA countries, as is the better international connectedness through the internet and media (see Figures 1 and 2). In contrast, cross-country personal contacts through tourism and travel appear to be very weakly related with the importance of religion (not shown). The respective correlation coefficients are 0.64, 0.24 and 0.10 for each globalization measure. Particularly economic globalization and the degree of religiosity show a strong correlation. Although no causal relation can be drawn from this analysis, globalization seems to be positively related to the degree of religiosity in those countries.

An alternative dimension of religiosity is defined as one's confidence in religious organizations and churches, measured on a 4-category scale, ranging from 'not at all' to 'a great deal'. Figure 3 presents the scatter plot for this measure of religiosity and informational globalization for 14 MENA countries and 27 country-year observations. There is a clearly negative correlation of informational globalization with people's confidence in religious organizations; the correlation coefficient is -0.29 (-0.06 for economic globalization and 0.02 for international personal contacts).

*Figure 1: Economic globalization and the importance of religion (MENA countries)*

*Figure 2: Informational globalization and the importance of religion (MENA countries)*

Figure 3: Informational globalization and confidence in religious organizations (MENA countries)

4.2. Econometric Analysis

4.2.1. Globalization and women's religious values in MENA and European countries

As next step we present results of a multivariate analysis of globalization and religiosity for women in the MENA region and Europe. We employ measures of religiosity and belief in religious values, particularly the belief in god, the importance of religion, self-reported religiosity, and service attendance. For this model and those to come, the regression model can be written in mathematical form as follows.

$$y_{its} = \alpha + \beta \; globalization_{ts} + X_{its}' \zeta + FE_t + FE_s + \varepsilon_{its}$$

Using probit or ordered probit estimators, we estimate the impact of the three facets of globalization on these measures of women's adherence to religious values. The regression model includes individual controls such as age (and age squared, age cubic) and religious denomination (X_{it}); the model also includes macro controls ($FE_t + FE_s$), particularly country fixed effects (that account for unobservable national characteristics such as culture and history), and year fixed

effects (that count for unobservable events shared by all countries in the region such as financial market crises). Finally, the log of the population completes the regression model; it accounts for the fact that smaller countries are more likely to be globalized, while large countries are, in tendency, more self-sufficient, autonomous and less internationally connected.

An issue of concern might be reversed causality; there is, however, little real-life evidence for the MENA region or Europe that religious attitudes in the population affected the degree of a country's economic and social openness. The decision to open up a country has in most cases been made by the political elite, as exemplified in many developing countries and in the formation of EU.

Table 1. Globalization and religious values and religiosity in MENA countries

MENA region	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Religion important in life	God important in life	Religious person	Attendance of service
Log (economic glob.)	2.325**	8.361**	1.141**	31.059**
	(7.71)	(23.19)	(32.61)	(21.27)
Log (pers. contacts)	-1.252*	44.244**	-13.056**	42.091**
	(3.15)	(6.93)	(38.39)	(20.47)
Log (inf. flow)	-0.702**	-51.836**	7.757**	18.643**
	(4.98)	(6.91)	(22.28)	(30.22)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Probit	Ordered probit
Observations	21'245	20'585	18'962	19'066
Countries	13	14	13	12
Pseudo R2	0.113	0.077	0.132	0.067

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), a dichotomous index of Muslim denomination, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 1 presents the regression results for the impact of economic globalization and globalization of information on four measures of religiosity and adherence to religious values of women in the MENA countries. We observe that the different dimensions of globalization exert differential (non-homogenous) effects: Economic globalization – a country's integration into global markets – increases women's likelihood of adherence to religious values and religiosity: the more a MENA country opens up to international trade, the higher the probability for its female residents

to find religion or god important in their lives, the more likely that they regard themselves as religious persons, and the more likely that they attend service in mosques or churches.[4] The estimation results for international personal contacts through travel and work and information globalization through the internet and media are mixed and difficult to interpret. Our reading is that international personal contacts and work experience foster religious beliefs (self-report importance of god, service attendance) while media and global communication rather weaken them (importance of religion or god in life).

Table 2. Globalization and religious values and religiosity in Europe

Region: Western Europe	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Religion important in life	God important in life	Religious person	Attendance of Service
Log (economic glob.)	0.036	0.191**	-0.037	0.045
	(0.16)	(2.71)	(0.23)	(0.51)
Log (pers. contacts)	0.596	-0.274	-0.388	0.388
	(0.78)	(0.64)	(0.64)	(0.79)
Log (inf. flow)	-0.124	-0.180	-0.088	-0.586***
	(0.41)	(0.84)	(0.25)	(4.65)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Probit	Ordered probit
Observations	30610	36495	34793	36172
Countries	21	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.115	0.08	0.202	0.103
Region: Eastern Europe	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log (economic glob.)	0.291+	0.178+	0.053	0.438***
	(2.37)	(2.10)	(0.37)	(4.04)
Log (pers. contacts)	-0.171	0.092	0.057	0.821+
	(0.63)	(0.33)	(0.15)	(2.52)
Log (inf. flow)	-0.159	-0.195	-0.719**	-0.261
	(1.07)	(1.34)	(3.19)	(1.11)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Probit	Ordered probit
Observations	30'252	29'796	28'844	30'441
Countries	20	20	20	20
Pseudo R2	0.16	0.112	0.243	0.112

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Overall these findings of Table 1 can be interpreted as follows. Economic globalization transforms the economy and society so violently that people seek guidance and support from their religious leaders and value systems. Similarly, personal contacts with people from alien cultures let women from MENA countries find and re-enforce their local cultural identity in religious (club) activities like attending service. On the other hand, critical information through the global media put one's own value system into question - letting women from MENA countries raise critical questions about their religious values and institutions.

For European countries, the estimation results of the same analysis are presented in Table 2. Because of the different histories between Eastern and Western Europe (post-communist, long-time isolated countries versus traditional democratic and open OECD countries), the country sample is split into two groups 'Eastern Europe' and 'Western Europe', defined by geographic location.

It appears that in Western Europe globalization has no impact on religious values whatsoever, with two exceptions: first, service attendance, which declines in cross-national media communication, and second, the importance of god, which increases in economic integration. For Eastern Europe, with a weak statistical significance at the 10 percent level, economic globalization appears to increase female residents' religious values and beliefs – this is a parallel development to that observed in the MENA region (see Table 1). In both Western and Eastern Europe, modern communication and information exchange has the tendency of lowering women's adherence to religious values and participation in religious activities (the coefficient signs are all negative throughout). However, in contrast to the MENA region, there is neither a fostering nor a lowering effect of information globalization through personal contacts, travel and work.

One may argue that in Western Europe the vast changes in countries' openness occurred prior to 1994, that is during the post-WW II period, while little changes in globalization are observable from the 1990s on. Indeed, e.g. France experienced from 1980 to 1995 an increase in economic openness by 30% (48 points to 63 points) , while there were little changes between 1995 and 2010 (69 points) (see also the discussion in Fischer & Somogyi, 2012). In addition, the WVS does not provide observations that pertain to Eastern Europe and the MENA region prior to the 1990s. For that reason, Table 3 analyses globalization effects for religious values in Western

Europe during two time periods: prior to 1994, and after 1994. Table 3 reveals that the decisive effects of globalization in Western Europe occurred all prior to 1994, during the cold war period. In tendency, the importance of religious values declines in economic openness, while the attendance-of-service decreasing effect of both economic and informational globalization appears particularly strong.

Table 3. Western Europe during Cold War era and after

year >= 1995	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Religion important in life	God important in life	Religious Person	Attendance of Service
Log (economic glob.)	1.058+	0.602	0.319	0.678
	(2.44)	(1.54)	(0.90)	(1.61)
Log (pers. contacts)	0.739	1.589	-0.117	1.819
	(0.52)	(1.05)	(0.09)	(1.11)
Log (inf. flow)	-0.159	-0.752	0.307	-1.138
	(0.15)	(0.75)	(0.31)	(1.14)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Probit	Ordered probit
Observations	204'32	20'689	19'792	20'077
Countries	21	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.124	0.085	0.205	0.098
year < 1995	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log (economic glob.)	-4.756+	0.303*	-0.073	-0.272**
	(2.41)	(3.19)	(0.27)	(3.94)
Log (pers. contacts)	-40.646*	-0.405	-1.406	0.638
	(2.66)	(0.52)	(1.02)	(0.73)
Log (inf. flow)	24.403*	-1.196*	0.042	-1.288*
	(2.60)	(2.83)	(0.04)	(3.09)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Probit	Ordered probit
Observations	10'178	15'806	15'001	16'095
Countries	17	17	17	17
Pseudo R2	0.095	0.075	0.194	0.106

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

4.2.2. Globalization and organizations of religion

Religious values can be followed and religiosity can be lived in private space and in institutional space such as mosques and churches equally. Hence the question arises whether or not the development we have observed for religious values and religiosity are similar for the institutions and organizations that claim to teach and safeguard those values. Specifically, we look at two measures: first, people's reported confidence in religious organizations, and second, their membership in such organizations. Confidence in religious organizations is measured on a 4-point scale, based on the question 'how much confidence do you have in them?'[5] Table 4 reports the empirical results for confidence in religion and Table 5 for membership in religious organizations.

Table 4. Globalization and confidence in religious organizations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Region	MENA	Europe	Western E.	Eastern E.	Western E., < 1995	Western E., > 1994
Log (economic glob.)	2.435**	0.095	0.237+	0.005	0.510**	-0.120
	(10.93)	(0.88)	(1.96)	(0.04)	(4.98)	(0.26)
Log (pers. contacts)	36.435**	-0.085	0.043	-0.046	0.510	2.927
	(9.95)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.76)	(1.87)
Log (inf. flow)	-45.005**	-0.715**	-0.950*	-0.460+	-2.420**	-2.609*
	(10.54)	(4.91)	(2.93)	(2.54)	(4.98)	(2.69)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit
Observations	19'004	65'503	35'471	30'032	15'473	19'998
Countries	13	41	21	20	16	21
Pseudo R2	0.074	0.096	0.097	0.077	0.101	0.097

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

The most striking finding is that exposure to international flows of information through the internet and media make people more critical toward churches and other religious organizations. This development is observable in both the MENA region, and Eastern and Western Europe. In Western Europe, this influence of informational globalization is stronger during the Cold War

period. Only observable in the MENA region, cross-national personal contacts increase people's confidence in their religious institutions and organizations.

In contrast, international trade exerts the opposite effect: it raises people's confidence in religious organizations - this is observable both in the MENA region, and in Western Europe prior to 1995 (columns 1 and 5). For the remaining regions and time periods, economic globalization shows no effect. Obviously, with respect to economic globalization and informational globalization, the development of the MENA region since the 90ies is somewhat in parallel to the development in Western Europe prior to 1995, as a comparison of columns 1 and 5 of Table 4 reveals.

Another facet of religious organizations is membership in them. The WVS provides information on 'membership' in religious organizations; membership includes both active and passive memberships. In Europe, there is a financial incentive to cease the official membership in religious organizations for tax saving reasons. On the other hand, in Europe, churches run hospitals and kindergartens and other social enterprises, co-financed by the government.

Table 5. Globalization and membership in religious organizations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Region	MENA	Europe	Western E.	Eastern E.	Western E., < 1995	Western E., > 1994
Log (economic glob.)	0.383	0.747*	0.949+	-0.151	-0.044	5.936**
	(0.58)	(2.97)	(2.42)	(0.99)	(0.11)	(4.98)
Log (pers. contacts)	1.219	0.182	1.108	-0.529	3.703	-7.281
	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.99)	(1.17)	(1.67)	(1.40)
Log (inf. flow)	-1.151	-1.197*	-2.326*	-0.452+	-1.416	0.537
	(0.80)	(3.16)	(2.87)	(2.21)	(0.89)	(0.24)
Estimation method	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit
Observations	13'155	65'298	36'792	28'506	16'206	20'582
Countries	12	41	21	20	17	21
Pseudo R2	0.209	0.191	0.188	0.159	0.102	0.229

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5 reports the results for the impact of globalization on the probability of being a member in religious organizations. In the MENA region, we do not observe any changes triggered by economic or informational globalization. In Europe, membership probability increases with international trade but decreases with greater exposure to the worldwide flow of information – a finding mostly driven by the pre-1995 era in Western Europe.

Table 6. Globalization and active and inactive memberships in religious organizations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Passive member		Active member	
Region	MENA	Europe	MENA	Europe
Log (economic glob.)	-2.249**	0.067	1.232**	-0.521
	(5.20)	(0.21)	(12.76)	(1.16)
Log (pers. contacts)	-13.812**	0.066	-0.857**	-0.364
	(20.49)	(0.06)	(5.80)	(0.31)
Log (inf. flow)	26.508**	-1.901**	-2.553**	-1.027
	(15.09)	(3.86)	(6.95)	(1.86)
Estimation method	Multinomial Logit; base category: no membership			
Observations	11'519	29'534		
Countries	12	32		
Pseudo R2	0.177	0.203		

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

We can differentiate between active and passive membership for only some waves of the WVS. These few observations permit only an analysis for the MENA region and Europe; most of the observations are from either the mid-nineties (1994-1997) and from 2000 or later. Table 6 presents multinomial logit estimation results in which non-membership serves as the reference outcome or base category.

Table 6 gives us differentiated results for active and passive memberships particularly for the MENA region, while globalization affects membership only little in European countries. For MENA countries, it appears that international trade causes a polarization in the female population: In response to intensified international trade, women in the MENA region either drop

out of religious organizations or they become more active, more religious members. While international personal contacts decrease the probability of active or passive memberships likewise (over being a non-member), the international flow of information appears, again, to make women more critical towards active engagement in religious organizations, decreasing the probability of active memberships. For Europe, in contrast, we observe only that information globalization lets inactive members become non-members of religious organizations, thus not affecting those who are actively engaged in their churches.

Summary for religious values

Overall, confidence in religious institutions is affected the same way as is adherence to religious values: economic globalization causes people to revert to religion as institution and to its specific value system, while globalization of information decreases people's confidence in such institutions and values. This development is observable in both the MENA region and Europe, particularly Western Europe prior to 1995. For the MENA region, cross-national personal contacts appear to foster religious values.

4.2.3. Globalization and secular conservative values

Historically, religious values gave rise to political and social conservatism restricting women's access to the labor market, while 'progressive' political parties rejected religious institutions and the role they played in preserving the traditional role model. Nowadays, however, this clear distinction between conservative-religious and progressive-atheist attitudes has been blurred: e.g., today it is not uncommon to be religious and to share progressive views at the same time. Therefore it is necessary to analyze conservative secular values separately from religious values when discussing the societal effects of economic and informational globalization. Conservative socio-political values and attitudes are defined as adherence to the patriarchic family structure, which supports the traditional role model, assigning women the role of household worker and childcare giver and men the role of household head and breadwinner; this view affects fertility decisions, the distribution of resources among family members and the desirability of the state of marriage for a woman.

To measure women's social and political conservatism, the following survey questions of the WVS are employed: The question about the importance of family in respondent's life, measured in 4 categories from (1) "not important at all" to (4) "very important"; the question on whether university education should be more for boys than for girls, and the question on whether men are better political leaders than women, with answers to both questions measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from (1) "strongly disagree" to (4) "agree strongly". We also employ three questions on whether the respondents believe that certain actions are justifiable: divorce, abortion, or suicide. The survey question 'please tell me whether the following action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:…' allows answers on a 10-point scale, with (after recoding) the highest value given to the most conservative attitude, that is viewing divorce, abortion, etc. as never justifiable. The empirical analysis applies regression model (1) accordingly.

In line with this traditional-conservative attitude is possibly that family is viewed as an important institution in society, that parental educational investment in boys should be larger than that in girls, and that politics is the sphere of men rather than women. In addition, we believe that conservative women are most likely to reject abortion (as this constitutes a rejection of the role of motherhood) and to be against divorce (as divorce is regarded as threat to the institution 'family'). In addition, also suicide should not be justifiable, rejecting the divine gift of life and therefore constituting a 'sin' in all monotheistic religions.

Table 7 shows how globalization impacts conservative secular values of women in MENA countries. Economic integration has a decisive impact on the erosion of conservative values that relate directly to female labor market participation (columns 1 and 2): with increased economic globalization, women in MENA countries have a higher probability to report that family is less important, and that boys should not be preferred when it comes to university education (and also that divorce can be justified, at the 10 percent level). While these two conservative values are considerably weakened by economic globalization, the remaining conservative attitudes appear to be fostered: women in MENA countries are more likely to believe that men form better political leaders, and that abortion and suicide are never justified.

Informational globalization appears to trigger some critical distance toward conservative values, particularly toward those not pertaining to labor market participation (divorce, abortion, suicide);

in contrast, international personal contacts foster those conservative values (columns 3 through 6). Values pertaining to labor market participation are not affected at all by any type of worldwide information sharing (columns 1 and 2).

Table 7. Globalization and conservative values in MENA countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Family important in life	University more for boys than girls	Men better political leaders	Divorce never justified	Abortion never justified	Suicide never justified
Log (economic glob.)	-1.539**	-2.481**	2.696**	-0.532+	0.893**	4.633**
	(7.63)	(14.19)	(20.36)	(2.47)	(6.78)	(25.73)
Log (pers. contacts)	4.771	-4.363	5.402*	32.027**	55.528**	66.792**
	(1.28)	(1.34)	(3.03)	(8.93)	(23.67)	(20.95)
Log (inf. flow)	-6.163	0.818	-9.553**	-33.306**	-58.841**	-72.941**
	(1.44)	(0.22)	(4.62)	(8.02)	(21.51)	(19.89)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit
Obs.	21'275	19'808	19'370	19'201	16'580	14'810
Countries	13	13	13	14	14	13
Pseudo R2	0.060	0.021	0.061	0.048	0.050	0.069

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), a dichotomous index of Muslim denomination, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 8 reports the results for Eastern Europe, for which we have observations from 1992 on. In general, there are only a few incidences where facets of globalization appear to affect women's conservative values: international trade increases women's likelihood to accept divorce as justifiable, international personal contacts lead women to treat boys and girls more unequally when it comes to university education. In contrast, cross-national communication and information flows tend to make Eastern European women less conservative with respect to almost all secular conservative values tested.

Table 8. Globalization and conservative values in Eastern Europe

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Family important in life	University more for boys than girls	Men better political leaders	Divorce never justifiable	Abortion never justifiable	Suicide never justifiable
Log (economic glob.)	0.164	0.160	-0.174	-0.278*	-0.101	0.245
	(0.97)	(1.22)	(1.68)	(2.89)	(0.81)	(0.84)
Log (pers. contacts)	-0.092	0.977**	0.608	-0.139	0.387	0.896
	(0.20)	(11.12)	(1.55)	(0.50)	(1.40)	(1.30)
Log (inf. flow)	-0.177	-0.455*	0.165+	-0.368**	-0.224+	-0.505
	(1.41)	(2.82)	(1.98)	(3.66)	(2.29)	(1.19)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit
Observations	31'088	22'322	21'746	27'852	27'746	27'669
Countries	20	18	18	20	20	20
Pseudo R2	0.074	0.036	0.034	0.036	0.046	0.047

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 9 presents the more interesting case of women in Western Europe. As before, the results are presented for both the full sample from 1981 to 2014, and the two sub-samples pre-1995 and post-1995. Certain measures of political and social conservatism ('men make better political leaders', 'university education better for boys than for boys') were not recorded for a sufficient number of countries so that they had to be excluded from the analysis. The results for the full sample of Western Europe are reported in columns 1-4, while the results for the pre-1995 period are reported in columns 6-8 below, and those for the post-1995 period are reported in columns 9-12.

Looking at Western Europe in its entire period 1981 through 2014, there is no impact of any facet of globalization on secular conservative values - this picture changes when we allow for the impact of globalization to differ between pre-1995 and post-1994 phases. It appears that during the cold war era values pertaining to the labor market were altered, while the remaining conservative values appear strongly affected after 1995. During the Cold War era, economic

globalization but also international personal contacts decrease women's adherence to those conservative values that directly pertained to labor market participation (importance of family). In the post-Cold War era instead, economic globalization negatively affects all other measures of conservatism (divorce, suicide, abortion) in this analysis. We can conclude that economic globalization influences, as a first step, women's view on her family, directly affecting her employment decisions, and then, decades later, the whole spectrum of conservative secular values that affect any decision. In general, the information flow through the internet appears equally destructive to female adherence to conservative secular values, while cross-national personal contacts appear to play little role.

Table 9. Globalization and conservative values in Western Europe

	Importance of family	Divorce never justifiable	Abortion never justifiable	Suicide never justifiable
Full sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log (econ. glob.)	0.099	-0.041	-0.239	-0.297
	(0.51)	(0.28)	(1.48)	(1.35)
Log (pers. contacts)	-0.150	1.495+	2.066+	-0.082
	(0.17)	(2.27)	(2.34)	(0.09)
Log (inf. flow)	0.298	0.013	0.217	-0.242
	(1.07)	(0.03)	(0.66)	(0.42)
Estimation method	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit
Observations	30'897	36'303	35'843	35'095
Countries	21	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.041	0.037	0.051	0.062
Time: < 1995	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log (econ. glob.)	-7.803**	0.306	0.012	0.336
	(9.32)	(1.25)	(0.04)	(1.58)
Log (pers. contacts)	-14.583**	-1.279	-0.264	-1.890
	(9.46)	(0.81)	(0.15)	(1.66)
Log (inf. flow)	11.153**	-1.172	-3.114**	1.244
	(10.83)	(1.32)	(3.35)	(1.74)
Observations	10'278	15'738	15'389	15'376
Countries	17	17	17	17
Pseudo R2	0.048	0.028	0.045	0.035
Time: > 1994	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Log (econ. glob.)	1.104	-1.938**	-0.544	-3.622**
	(2.02)	(3.50)	(1.16)	(5.88)
Log (pers. contacts)	-2.037	5.938**	2.207	-1.434
	(1.51)	(3.29)	(1.27)	(0.87)
Log (inf. flow)	0.558	-0.834	0.755	1.178
	(0.82)	(0.91)	(0.88)	(1.50)
Observations	20'619	20'565	20'454	19'719
Countries	21	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.037	0.033	0.050	0.093

Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

4.2.4. Conservatism and female labor market participation

Religious values, religiosity and female employment

In the first part of the empirical analysis, we have investigated how globalization affects female conservatism – that is religious or secular conservatism. But do these values affect women's behavior, in particular their labor market participation? This section addresses this question. The WVS data provides also information on respondent's labor market status (besides age, gender, religion, the country of residence and survey year). The labor market status allows for the following categories: fully employed, half-time employed, self-employed, unemployed, but also housewife, disabled (other), student/apprentice, and retired. In the conventional definition of labor market participation, an 'active' person is defined as either 'employed' or 'officially recorded unemployed'. Many developing and transition countries as well as Southern European countries, however, do not have well-developed welfare state institutions of unemployment benefits that cover a long time period. Hence the group of persons actively seeking a job but reporting in any other group of employment status might have a significant share. For this reason, we use a definition of 'unemployed' including any other non-employment status such as 'unemployed', 'housewife', 'other' and 'early retired', excluding 'students'. As in the part on globalization and religious and conservative values, the analysis is restricted to women between the ages of 18 and 60. We apply regression model (1) accordingly; for computational ease estimations are carried out with Logit.

Table 10 reveals that in the MENA countries women who adhere to religious values are less likely to be working, as expected (columns 1 through 4): The more women state that religion or god is important to them in their lives, the less likely they are reported as 'employed' in the survey. The same is observed for women who have stronger confidence in religious organizations. For self-report religious women, we observe the same tendency (significant at the 10 percent level). Table 10 also shows analogous findings for both Eastern and Western Europe equally (columns 5 through 12). With respect to how religious values affect employment decisions, women in MENA countries react like women in Western and Eastern Europe, irrespective of their denomination.

Table 10. Religious values and female employment in MENA countries and Europe

Determinant of interest	Religious person	Religion is important in life	God is important in life	Confidence in religious organizations
Region: MENA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Religious	-0.459+	-0.471**	-0.137**	-0.282**
	(2.14)	(4.34)	(4.00)	(5.24)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	18'232	20'487	19'840	18'278
Countries	13	13	14	13
Pseudo R2	0.172	0.183	0.191	0.190
Region: Western Europe	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	-0.181**	-0.170**	-0.052**	-0.143**
	(3.32)	(5.82)	(6.56)	(4.00)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	35'653	31'600	37'031	36'406
Countries	21	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.098	0.095	0.097	0.100
Region: Eastern Europe	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	-0.371*	-0.201**	-0.068**	-0.188**
	(2.78)	(3.57)	(4.37)	(4.74)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	30'368	32'043	30'688	32'008
Countries	20	20	20	20
Pseudo R2	0.174	0.176	0.169	0.177

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of religious values and religiosity are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings (see Table A2 and A3 of the Appendix). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Did the impact of religious values on female employment change over time? Only for Western Europe we can answer this question as the WVS surveys date back to 1981, while for the MENA countries and Eastern Europe survey data are available only from the mid-90s on. Table 11 compares Western Europe across two periods: the Cold War era 1981-1994 and the post-Cold

War era 1995-2014. We observe that the employment-lowering impact of religious values on women in Western Europe has been stable over the last 30 years.

Table 11. Religious values and female employment in Western Europe, during the Cold War era and after

Determinant of interest	Religious person	Religion is important in life	God is important in life	Confidence in religious organizations
West, < 1995	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	-0.215+	-0.040**	-0.061**	-0.182**
	(2.22)	(5.37)	(6.99)	(4.46)
Estimation method	Logit	OLS Logit not concave	Logit	Logit
Observations	15'985	11'312	16'473	16'538
Countries	18	18	18	17
Pseudo R2	0.124	-	0.121	0.128
West, > 1994	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	-0.152**	-0.153**	-0.044**	-0.102*
	(4.67)	(5.34)	(4.94)	(2.82)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	19'668	20'288	20'558	19'868
Countries	21	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.085	0.086	0.085	0.085

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations. All models include population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of religious values and religiosity are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings (see Table A3 of the Appendix). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Membership in religious organizations and female employment

We have already discussed that personal adherence to religious values and formal membership in religious organizations might be the two distinct facets of 'religiosity' - a difference that might then manifest in differing impacts on labor market behavior. Indeed, looking at female employment in the MENA region and Europe, Table 12 reveals that official membership in religious groups does not decisively affect women's employment, nor does attendance of service. Only those women in Europe who attend service once a week or more (or who are self-report

active in Eastern Europe) appear to be also religious persons in the sense of adhering to certain traditional values.[6]

Table 12. Affiliation in religious organization and female employment

	(1)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Region	MENA	MENA	Western Europe	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Eastern Europe	Eastern Europe
Determinant of interest							
Member religious group	-0.070		-0.034		-0.099+		
	(0.87)		(0.65)		(2.11)		
Passive member						0.015	
						(0.25)	
Active member						-0.231+	
						(2.22)	
Never, practically never		.		.			.
(reference group)							
Less often		0.037		0.028			0.118
		(0.36)		(0.55)			(1.05)
Once a year		0.076		0.094			0.100
		(1.08)		(1.55)			(1.08)
Only on special holy days		-0.130		0.032			-0.031
		(0.93)		(0.53)			(0.24)
Once a month		0.046		-0.039			-0.061
		(0.34)		(0.47)			(0.47)
Once a week		0.051		-0.268*			-0.230+
		(1.03)		(3.28)			(2.13)
More than once a week		-0.093		-0.487**			-0.537**
		(0.59)		(4.23)			(4.57)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	12'561	18'893	37'327	37'108	30'342	17'461	31'438
Countries	12	12	21	21	20	18	20
Pseudo R2	0.226	0.154	0.095	0.099	0.157	0.155	0.171

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Reference categories are: non-members in religious groups, attendance of service: (1) never. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

In general, membership in a relious group and active engagement in its group activities does not appear to impact employment of women in the same way as was observable for self-reported adherence to certain religious principles and values (Tables 10 and 11). This difference in labor market behavior between membership and religious values is apparent for the MENA region and Europe equally.

Conservative social and political values and employment of women

Whether or not adherence to conservative secular values has the expected (negative) impact on female employment in the regions under analysis is investigated in Table 13. To approximate a conservative attitude, the same set of variables is used as in the first part of the empirical analysis on globalization (Tables 7 through 9): the importance of family, the question of university education for girls, the view on men as better political leaders, and the questions concerning the justifiability of divorce, suicide, and abortion.

Table 13 reveals that, in general, women who adhere to these secular conservative values and attitudes are less likely to be in gainful employment: women who state that university education is more for boys than for girls, women who state that men are better political leaders, and women who think that divorce or abortion are never justified are less likely to be in a paid position. This general observation holds true for the MENA region and Eastern and Western Europe likewise. We also observe in both regions that the importance of family works as a somewhat weaker restriction to female labor market participation (significances at the 10 percent levels), and the justifiability of suicide in case of the MENA countries. Overall, our prediction that conservative secular values impose a restriction on female labor market participation is fully confirmed.

Finally, Tables 14 analyses whether the effect of conservative socio-political values have restricted female labor market participation not only recently but also longer in the past. For Western Europe, answers recorded prior to 1994 are available to the questions on justifiability of divorce, abortion, or suicide. The empirical analysis reveals that conservative secular values are in opposition to women's employment for a longer time by now (pre-1995 as well as post-1994), yielding a stable effect over the last 30 years.

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Table 13. Conservatism and female employment in MENA region and Europe

Determinant of interest	Importance of family	University more for boys than girls	Men better political leaders	Divorce is never justifiable	Abortion is never justifiable	Suicide is never justifiable
Region: MENA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	-0.094	-0.207**	-0.203**	-0.066**	-0.085**	-0.024
	(0.91)	(3.52)	(4.35)	(4.05)	(3.51)	(1.42)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	20'516	19'072	18'641	18'465	15'846	14'109
Countries	13	13	13	14	14	13
Pseudo R2	0.176	0.184	0.184	0.208	0.212	0.211
Region: Eastern Europe	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	-0.109+	-0.200**	-0.161**	-0.059**	-0.037**	-0.023**
	(2.40)	(3.73)	(4.27)	(6.15)	(3.41)	(3.99)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	33'095	20'876	20'326	29'828	29'731	29'354
Countries	20	18	18	20	20	20
Pseudo R2	0.173	0.160	0.159	0.166	0.164	0.162
Region: Western Europe	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
	-0.158+	-0.182**	-0.132**	-0.072**	-0.074**	-0.050**
	(2.44)	(7.76)	(3.47)	(12.97)	(10.13)	(6.45)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	31'898	11'176	10'849	37'233	36'775	35'637
Countries	21	14	14	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.091	0.102	0.101	0.100	0.101	0.098

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of conservative values are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 14. Conservatism and female employment in Western Europe, 1981-1994 and 1995-2014

	Importance of family	University more for boys than girls	Men better political leaders	Divorce is never justifiable	Abortion is never justifiable	Suicide is never justifiable
Western Europe	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
> 1994	-0.124	-0.182**	-0.132**	-0.062**	-0.073**	-0.048**
	(1.62)	(7.76)	(3.47)	(11.26)	(8.08)	(5.41)
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Obs.	20475	11176	10849	20433	20324	19590
Countries	21	14	14	21	21	21
Pseudo R2	0.083	0.102	0.101	0.086	0.089	0.085
Western Europe	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
< 1995				-0.081**	-0.076**	-0.046**
				(8.57)	(8.66)	(4.49)
Estimation method	No convergence			Logit	Logit	Logit
Obs.		No obs.	No obs.	16800	16451	16047
Countries				18	18	18
Pseudo R2				0.127	0.126	0.121

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of conservative values are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The importance of gainful 'work' for human happiness and individual's self-esteem has undergone a profound societal change: until the 19th century having to work for one's living was considered a bare necessity for survival; the nobility, wealthy people and 'honorable' women of the higher classes spent their time on leisure time activities and politics only. Goldin (2006) reports for 1920ies and 1930ies in the USA that even then working women were considered a poor-class phenomenon where husbands' wage was not sufficiently high to sustain their families; also in Western Europe until the 1960ies it was common for women to terminate their work contracts the day the got married and started a family. This gendered division of labor in society was supported by the traditional role model that, as social norm, attributes to women household and care work and to men the role of sole breadwinner.

Today, in most developed and many developing countries, having gainful 'work' has become an important determinant of experienced utility, identity and self-esteem for both men and women alike (Bjørnskov, Dreher & Fischer, 2007). Sen (1999) argues that we view now income not only as a resource for consumption but also as means to social and political participation. This implies for women that earning their own income independently from men's allows them to participate in society as full members with equal rights. However, despite considerable improvements over time, labor markets continue to be characterized by gender disparity: specifically, sexually segregated jobs, large earning differentials between men and women, and a double-burden for women of both household work and gainful work (Elson & Cagatay, 2000) – all indicating the persistence of the traditional role model. However, gender roles assigned to men and women are socially constructed and contingent on cultural norms and, possibly, depend on the level of economic development and openness of the national economy (Fernandez, 2013). It is only recently that ordinary people started to question and revise these traditional-conservative attitudes.[7]

This chapter poses the question whether globalization of markets and society changes women's attitudes towards their secular and religious conservatism, and, ultimately, their labor market participation. Using an international survey on about 420'000 people in more than 80 countries from 1981 to 2014 that is matched with measures of economic and informational globalization at the country level, this study investigates this question comparing the predominantly Muslim

MENA region with the predominantly Christian Europe. Conservative values are measured as, first, one's degree of religiosity and adherence to religious values, and, second, one's degree of secular conservatism that is reflected in specific views on, e.g., abortion, divorce, and education of girls. Globalization is defined in three ways: first, economic globalization through flows of goods, services, and financial resources, second, informational globalization through internet and media, and, third, increased personal contacts through travel and tourism.

Adherence to religious values and religiosity gains in strength as economic globalization intensifies in the MENA region. Also international personal contracts seem to foster the religious belief of women in this region; in contrast, access to global media and communication rather weaken them. While these findings are not conclusive for Western Europe, a similar effect is observed for Eastern Europe. In all three regions, however, exposure to the international flow of information through the internet and media makes people more critical toward religious organizations. Possibly, reverting to religious values and organization as economic globalization transforms society and economy constitutes a form of psychic and social self-protection.

Secular conservative values and attitudes in the MENA region are eroded by economic globalization if they pertain to female labor market participation (i.e. the role of family and girls' education) while the remaining conservative attitudes appear to be fostered. In Western Europe we observe a similar outlook: pre-1995 only secular conservative values restricting gainful employment are eroded by economic integration, while after 1995 all other secular conservative values are equally negatively affected. Eastern Europe appears to be on a different path of development. Based on these findings, we can conclude that the development Western Europe undergoes from 1995 on, the erosion of all secular-conservative values on a broad scale, is a prediction of what will happen in the MENA region in the coming decades.

Female labor force participation is negatively affected by adherence to religious values in both the MENA region and Eastern and Western Europe likewise. It is also seen that this negative effect has been observed in Western Europe throughout the last 30 years, in our study between 1980 and 2014. When we look at the impact of secular conservative values and attitudes, the same negative and persistent effect on female labor market attachment is documented for all three regions under analysis.

There are seemingly many similarities between women in the MENA region and those in Western Europe: both respond to increased globalization of information with a more critical distance toward religious values and conservative attitudes – independent of their religious denomination. Women in both regions also show the same behavior toward employment: the more secular-conservative or religious they are, the less likely they participate in the labor market. It also appears that women adapt their preferences to a changing economic environment, caused by the transforming forces of economic globalization; those secular conservative values constituting an (internal) restriction to labor market participation appear to fall apart first - this development is observable in both Western Europe prior to 1995 and in the MENA region nowadays. In Western Europe, the remaining secular values follow this pattern later, serving as prediction of what might happen in the MENA countries in the future.

Major policy implications of this study are that labor force participation of women can be promoted through both economic globalization and through increased access to internet and global media. First, through increased international integration of the country into global markets, economic globalization appears to change women's attitude toward the desirability of becoming employed; second, through increased access to global media and internet, informational globalization appears to weaken adherence to the traditional role model and conservative-secular and religious values.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Globalization: increased economic, political, social and cultural integration of countries into the world

Female labor force participation: female population share that is employed or actively seeking a job.

Identity: person's sense of self

Religiosity: adherence to religious values and belief systems

Conservative values: adherence to the traditional role model which assigns to men the role of breadwinner and to women the role of household workers and childcare givers

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APPENDIX

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
			Region: MENA		
Economic globalization	17'310	49.49	15.41	16.95	81.25
Informational globalization	17'310	65.49	10.29	30.22	84.84
Cross-national personal contacts	17'310	39.05	18.51	25.02	86.13
Age	22'258	35.51	10.8815	18	60
Muslim	22'258	.62	.49	0	1
Orthodox	22'258	.003	.06	0	1
Protestant	22'258	.02	.15	0	1
Catholic	22'258	.007	.08	0	1
			Region: Western Europe		
Economic globalization	35'982	62.96	19.83	22.53	99.52
Informational globalization	35'982	73.20	13.82	45.16	94.43
Cross-national personal contacts	35'982	72.02	94.22	42.47	94.46
Age	38'505	39.12	11.63	18	60
Muslim	38'505	.005	.07	0	1
Orthodox	38'505	.003	.05	0	1
Protestant	38'505	.23	.42	0	1
Catholic	38'505	.44	.50	0	1
			Region: Eastern Europe		
Economic globalization	33'197	50.23	17.01	26.99	92.14
Informational globalization	33'197	68.93	14.73	30.22	98.52
Cross-national personal contacts	33'197	54.04	12.08	35.09	85.83
Age	37'725	39.06	11.52	18	60
Muslim	37'725	.15	.36	0	1
Orthodox	37'725	.36	.48	0	1
Protestant	37'725	.02	.14	0	1
Catholic	37'725	.20	.40	0	1

Notes: World Values Survey (2014) micro data 1981-2014 matched with KOF-ETH indices of globalization at the country-year level. The Jewish population in the MENA region resides almost entirely in Israel; the country fixed effect picks then up this religious denomination.

Table A2: Religious values and labor market participation in MENA countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Religious	-0.459+			
	(2.14)			
Religion is important: not very important (2)		0.163		
		(1.09)		
Religion is important: somewhat important (3)		-0.517+		
		(2.37)		
Religion is important: very important (4)		-1.035*		
		(3.22)		
God is important in life: (2)			-0.276	
			(0.64)	
God is important in life: (3)			0.062	
			(0.25)	
God is important in life: (4)			0.381	
			(1.09)	
God is important in life: (5)			-0.076	
			(0.26)	
God is important in life: (6)			-0.047	
			(0.21)	
God is important in life: (7)			-0.136	
			(0.70)	
God is important in life: (8)			-0.154	
			(0.95)	
God is important in life: (9)			-0.638**	
			(3.33)	
God is important in life: (10) very important			-0.837**	
			(4.38)	
Confidence in church: (2) not very much				-0.070
				(1.64)
Confidence in church: (3) quite a lot and				-0.404*
				(4.06)
Confidence in church: (4) a great deal				-0.742*
				(5.08)
Region	MENA	MENA	MENA	MENA
Estimation method	Logistic	Logistic	Logistic	Logistic
Observations	18.232	20.487	19.840	18.278
Countries	13	13	14	13
Pseudo R2	0.172	0.184	0.193	0.191

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country

fixed effects. Reference categories are: Religion is not important at all (1), God is not important at all (1), confidence in church: none at all (1). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table A3: Religious values and labor market participation in European countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Religious	-0.181**				-0.371*			
	(3.32)				(2.78)			
Rel. imp.: (2)		0.029				-0.051		
		(0.36)				(0.83)		
Rel. imp.: (3)		-0.211*				-0.206+		
		(2.67)				(2.39)		
Rel. imp.: (4)		-0.473**				-0.551**		
		(5.16)				(3.66)		
God imp.: (2)			0.186*				0.033	
			(2.98)				(0.53)	
God imp.: (3)			0.076				-0.020	
			(1.00)				(0.31)	
God imp.: (4)			-0.041				-0.136	
			(0.82)				(1.83)	
God imp.: (5)			-0.121				-0.107	
			(1.65)				(1.13)	
God imp.: (6)			-0.074				-0.093	
			(1.39)				(1.01)	
God imp.: (7)			-0.070				-0.116	
			(0.99)				(1.35)	
God imp.: (8)			-0.239*				-0.233+	
			(3.26)				(2.56)	
God imp.: (9)			-0.240+				-0.314*	
			(2.51)				(2.94)	
God imp.: (10)			-0.434**				-0.564**	
			(5.93)				(4.60)	
Conf. in church: (2)				0.067				0.012
				(0.96)				(0.20)
Conf. in church: (3)				-0.078				-0.165
				(0.82)				(1.85)
Conf. in church: (4)				-0.413**				-0.488**
				(4.20)				(3.96)
Region: Europe	West	West	West	West	East	East	East	East
Estimation method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Observations	35'653	31'600	37'031	36'406	30'368	32'043	30'688	32'008
Countries	21	21	21	21	20	20	20	20
Pseudo R2	0.098	0.096	0.098	0.101	0.174	0.176	0.170	0.177

Notes: Dependent variable is 'employed', with comparison category being 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Reference categories are: non-members in religious groups, attendance of service: (1) never. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

ENDNOTES

[1] Another channels through which identity expands to economic behavior is that identity constitutes a new type of externality in the sense that one's actions can have (negative or positive) meaning for, or impact on, third persons. Akerlof & Kranton (2000).

[2] Similar findings on the negative effect of conservatism on female labor force participation are also reported for Latin America. See, for example, Contreras & Plaza (2010) for Chile, and Fernandez (2013) for the USA.

[3] The possible answers are recorded in four categories, ranging from 'very important', over 'somewhat important', to 'not important at all' in the lowest category.

[4] We also find that economic globalization fosters 'belief in hell' at the 1 percent significance level. Because of the relatively small number of observations (12'000 observations for the MENA region and other regions) and mainly the cross-sectional identification strategy, we prefer not to include them in the table.

[5] The scale is the same as before: (1) none at all (2) not very much (3) quite a lot and (4) a great deal.

[6] In Europe (East and West combined), the impact of service attendance on female employment appears to be driven by Catholics, Muslims and persons who are not member of any of the four major religious groups (Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Orthodox). For Protestants, some service attendance exerts a positive impact on female employment. Orthodox persons we observe some heterogeneity. In the MENA region, the non-importance of service attendance for female employment does not depend on respondent's denomination.

[7] Starting with the 1990s the sharp feminist critique against the male-breadwinner model, a new regime known as 'the adult worker model' became dominant, encouraging employment for both men and women (Lewis, 2001).