Bargaining agenda, timing, and entry

Fanti, Luciano and Buccella, Domenico (2015): Bargaining agenda, timing, and entry.

Abstract

In a unionised Cournot duopoly, the present paper extensively re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope between firms and unions. It investigates the endogenous equilibrium agenda (Right-to-Manage vs Efficient Bargaining) that can arise under three timing specification of the bargaining game both for a given duopoly and monopoly with threat of entry. A novel result is that, in sequential negotiations, Efficient Bargaining emerges in equilibrium for a range of the unions’ power larger than in simultaneous negotiations. Moreover, given the potential market deterrence effect of the Efficient Bargaining, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially “efficient” can be reversed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Efficient Bargaining; Right-to-manage; Cournot duopoly; Firm-union bargaining agenda
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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