Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?

Schmitz, Patrick W. (1997): Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? Published in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften , Vol. 48, No. 3 (1997): pp. 351-360.

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Abstract

This article considers a bilateral externality problem, in which injurers and victims choose activity levels and levels of care. The incentive effects of liability rules and fines for harm done are analyzed. It is shown that in general socially optimal behaviour can only be induced if fines are imposed. However, if collusion between the injurer and the victim is possible, we cannot achieve more with the help of fines than with liability rules alone.

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