Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Telecommunication regulation as a game: deepening theoretical understanding

Monasso, Ton and van Leijden, Fabian (2007): Telecommunication regulation as a game: deepening theoretical understanding.

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Abstract

This working paper extends the mainstream theoretical thinking in the field of telecommunications regulations to better fit with processes perceived in rural areas. The implicit framework of Levy & Spiller, Berg and Stern & Holder is extended to incorporate ideas of public administration theory, especially Kiser & Ostrom’s three levels of action. In this way, processes at different policy levels are viewed as games in themselves and we can better explain the observed behaviour of actors and the outcomes of the regulatory process than mainstream thinking does.

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