Civic Participation of Immigrants: Culture Transmission and Assimilation

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Abstract

This paper employs the European Social Survey and the World Values Survey to empirically investigate civic participation of immigrants from fifty-four countries of origin to the European Union. Three sets of issues are addressed in this paper. First, the paper aims at understanding what factors determine civic participation of immigrants at large. Second, it seeks to shed light on differences and similarities between participation outcomes of immigrants and natives. The main part of the paper is dedicated to testing culture transmission and culture assimilation hypothesis with respect to civic participation. Culture assimilation is analysed within the traditional synthetic cohort methodology, and also by testing whether the levels of immigrants' civic participation depend on the levels of natives' civic participation in the same countries. Culture transmission is looked at by relating the levels of participation of non-migrants in countries of origin to participation outcomes of those who migrate. In addition, the effect of other country of origin and country of destination characteristics on immigrants' civic participation is investigated. The issue of immigrants' self-selection is addressed by matching immigrants to otherwise similar natives and compatriots who did not migrate. The study finds limited evidence for the transmission of participation culture across borders, although certain home country characteristics continue influencing participation behaviour of individuals after migration: it is those from industrialized, net immigration, culturally more homogeneous countries who tend to participate more. On the other hand, the culture of current place of residence matters most in that by observing higher (lower) participation patterns among natives immigrants tend to participate more (less).

JEL Classification: J61, Z13
Keywords: immigration, civic participation, social assimilation, culture transmission

I. Introduction

The immigrant population in Europe has been steadily increasing in the past decades and most probably will continue increasing in the future. Consequently, already today, first and second generation immigrants constitute large and growing percentages of young generations in Europe, with the total number of third-country nationals living in the 25 EU Member States in 2005 estimated to be 11,44% of the total population (UN Statistics, 2005). The arrival and the continuing stay of immigrants, their families, the growth and diversification of both first and second generation of immigrants, raises questions about their involvement in processes affecting their lives and the lives of native residents, that is, about immigrants' engagement into civic activities.

While certain aspects of immigrants' life are well documented in the literature, such as immigrants' labour market assimilation (Borjas, 1995; Chiswick, 1978; Uhlendorff and Zimmermann, 2006), participation to welfare programs (Borjas, 2002; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Riphahn, 1999), and fertility adjustment (Blau, 1991; Fernandez and Fogli, 2005), this paper sheds light on yet another aspect of immigrants' behaviour in a receiving society: civic participation. Focusing on first generation immigrants only, it offers an empirical investigation of determinants of civic participation of immigrants; differences in propensity to participate between immigrants and natives; and whether culture transmission and/or culture assimilation of immigrants with respect to participation take place.

With the notable exception of works by Dustmann (1996), who analyses the perceived feeling of national identity of immigrants, and by De Palo, Faini, and Venturini (2007), who study social interactions of immigrants, little is known about immigrants' social assimilation. The latter, however, may have important implications for both the cultural assimilation at large, and also for immigrants' economic integration, as well as the permanency of settlement intentions, all of which are currently hotly debated topics. This paper addresses a particular type of assimilation, assimilation with respect to civic participation, in a two-fold way. I use a traditional immigrant assimilation hypothesis, which predicts that the growth of civic involvement between two points in time should be greater for immigrants who have spent less time in the country at the beginning of period in consideration (Borjas, 1995). The synthetic cohort methodology is applied, allowing to disentangle the effects of years since migration, age at migration, ageing, and cohort effects. The positive effect of the years since migration on participation outcomes serves as potential evidence in support of assimilation hypothesis. In addition, I test whether the participation culture of the receiving society matters for determining immigrants' participation outcomes, conjecturing that positive impact of overall natives' rate of

participation can serve as another piece of evidence in favour of assimilation hypothesis. While recent literature has shown the way immigrants are perceived by host societies (for example, Dusmann and Preston, 2000; Mayda, 2005 study attitudes towards immigrants), little is still known about the way immigrants perceive host societies, and whether certain behavioural patterns of a receiving society have an impact on the behaviour of immigrants.

Further, of interest is also to learn which effect has the strongest impact: the observed outcomes of natives, that is, the society in which an immigrant currently lives, or the observed outcomes of home country fellows back at home, that is, the society from which an immigrant originates? If an immigrant comes from a country where civic participation levels are high, would these participation levels and practices translate into her higher participation abroad? In other words, is there culture transmission in terms of participation? This is an important question in view of the research on economics and culture (such as Fernandez, 2007), ethnic capital and intergenerational transmission of culture (such as Borjas, 1992; Bisin and Verdier, 2001), since, once transmitted across boarders, the culture of civic participation may persist across generations.

Methodologically, the research is close to the literature on immigrants' participation to welfare programs, as well as to the literature on the fertility adjustment of migrant women. At the same time, a methodological novelty of this paper is to address the issue of immigrants' self-selection and to reduce potential bias that may stem from it by employing a matching technique, whereby matching immigrants to otherwise similar natives and compatriots who did not migrate. An advantage of such matching is that no assumption is put on whether immigrants are self-selected from a lower or from an upper part of the participation outcomes' distribution; rather, each immigrant is compared to a non-immigrant who, given other than the fact of migration characteristics, has the same probability to participate civically.

This paper also goes deeper into the analysis of other home and host country effects, in addition to examining the impact of the average rates of civic participation in these societies. To complement the existing research of studying the overall effect of the country of origin (for instance, Bueker, 2005) I disentangle various home and host country effects that may determine participation outcomes, such as the degree of civic freedoms and democratic development, GDP per capita, industrialization, literacy, level of migration and religious fragmentation of both reference societies.

In order to address these questions, I work with the European Social Survey (ESS), which provides extensive information on roughly 75,000 individuals (over the years 2002 to 2005) residing in 25 European Union countries. Of them, roughly six and a half thousands are foreign-

born. The database contains information on socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as well as on various forms of their civic involvement. I use these data to construct a sample of roughly four thousand immigrants from fifty-four countries of origin in twenty European countries. The major drawback of this study is that the European Social Survey does not specifically target immigrant groups and is conducted with the registered population. Thus, there is an issue of representability of immigrants, as they appear in the sample only if they were registered at the time of the survey. There could also be a selection bias in favour of well-educated and well-integrated immigrants, as there were no interview translations. As these factors are also correlated with civic participation (see below), the results may rather overestimate immigrant participation. The results of the study should be interpreted bearing in mind this limitation. On the other hand, ESS is one of the very few datasets which covers this many countries of origin and of destination, and which also contains a variety of questions on civic participation phrased in the same way across countries.

In addition, to study the impact of the source country characteristics on current levels of immigrants' activism, I employ the World Values Survey, constructing from it average participation rates in fifty-four countries of origin of immigrants to the EU. Further, I complement these data with the statistics of the UN Population Division, World Bank Development Indicators, and CIRI database, to construct other country characteristics.

While the focus of this paper is on civic participation, there is no unique definition of civic activism (for a review of definitions and types of activities considered as civic activism, see Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, I focus on active civic participation which implies political and social participation that goes beyond voting and gives voice to societal concerns, but that does not include civil activities (such as participation in sports clubs or hobby groups). In order to account for various possible types of participation, I focus on traditional forms of civic participation but also include those that are available to immigrants regardless of their citizenship and legal status, as the latter may restrict involvement into certain activities. Throughout the paper, by active civic participation, I mean membership in trade unions and political parties, unpaid work for a party or any other organization or association, signing petitions, boycotting certain products, and participation to lawful demonstrations. The choice of types of civic activities considered in this paper is also framed by the data availability. Inclusion of certain activities, such as signing petitions and boycotting products, is motivated by the fact that in the absence or limitation of voting rights immigrants may voice their concerns through mentioned actions. Voting is excluded from the analysis, as it is still very much restricted for non-citizens, and voting procedures differ greatly between the EU

countries. Furthermore, since voting may be mandatory in either a destination or an origin country, including it into the analysis would obscure the analysis of transmission of voluntary behaviours. Participation in trade unions is included, as recently trade unions became centers of help to immigrants, and participation to them is not limited neither by citizenship nor by the legality of the immigration status (Danese, 2001). Moreover, participation to trade unions gives immigrants "intermediate political rights" (Kosic and Tryandafyllidou, 2006), and is sometimes refereed to as to the "cradle of immigrants' political participation" (Martiniello, 2005).

The study finds limited evidence for the culture transmission hypothesis, although certain country characteristics do influence participation outcomes of immigrants: it is those from industrialized, net immigration, culturally more homogeneous countries who tend to participate more. On the other hand, there is a strong support for the culture assimilation with respect to participation hypothesis: while destination country characteristics have no significant impact on participation, it is by observing what natives do that immigrants tend to do the same.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II lays down the background and develops the connection of this paper with the existing literature. Section III describes the data used for the analysis. In Section IV I elaborate on the estimation procedure and present the main results of this study. Section V provides robustness check for these results, employing alternative estimation techniques and propensity score matching to deal with selection bias. Finally, in Section VI the role of various country effects is examined, and Section VII concludes.

II. Background and Related Literature

The analysis of this paper, both in terms of developing the idea and in terms of methodology, is related to the following strands of literature: on immigrants' involvement into civic activities and their political incorporation, on participation and social assimilation, on culture transmission, on immigrants' participation to welfare programs, and also on the fertility choices of immigrants. Much of the research on immigrants' participation has been done in the field of sociology and political economy. However, to the best of my knowledge, no research has been done on civic participation of immigrants using the economic tools of analysis, and this paper is trying to fill the gap.

In terms of developing the ideas, this paper is motivated by a growing interest of policy-makers in immigrants' involvement into civic activities. Several academic and public policy-oriented projects both in the USA and in Europe stimulated the research debate in the area. For example, Civic Participation Initiative sponsored by the Washington Area Partnership for Immigrants conducted an extensive study on immigrants' civic participation in Washington in

2002 (ASDC report, 2002). In Europe, the most recent initiative has been a multi-faceted research conducted under the umbrella of the EC project "POLITIS: Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into Civic Participation of Naturalized Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries" (see Cyrus et al, 2006). POLITIS working paper series (for instance, Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2005) address numerous challenges of understanding civic participation of immigrants, its determinants, barriers to participation, activation mechanism of immigrant's participation, as well as differences between natives and immigrants regarding participation.

Further, Danese (2001) explores weaknesses and strengths of immigrant's associations; Fennema and Tillie (1999) analyse differences in political participation and political trust between various ethnic groups in Amsterdam. Bueker (2005) investigates home country effects on acquisition of citizenship and on voting of ten immigration groups in the United States. Applying multivariate analysis, she finds strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that country of origin effects matter for the propensity of political incorporation, all other individual socio-economic factors taken into account. Bueker tests five hypotheses concerning voting and naturalization patterns: reversibility (which implies that difficulties associated with return migration would encourage higher rates of naturalization among certain immigrant groups), translation (political practises at the origin impact political behaviour at destination), mobilization (certain groups will exercise their political rights more fully in wake of highly developed ethnic communities), assimilation and gender diversity hypotheses. The difference of my study is that, apart from analysing civic participation beyond voting and aside naturalization, I delve deeper into the translation hypothesis, analysing how specific country characteristics, such as the average participation rates, home country institutions, to name a few (rather than the overall country effects captured by country dummies) transmit their effect across borders.

There is a large literature that provides analysis of individual participation in various social activities and groups mainly relating it to the notion of social capital. The pioneering works of Putnam (1993, 1995), which document the declining participation of Americans in civic life, have become standard references for social scientists, including the economists. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) analyse various forms of participation of Americans. They construct a model that shows how a larger degree of heterogeneity in communities leads to lower social interaction. Using survey data on group membership in the US, they find strong empirical evidence that higher income inequality, racial, and, to a lesser extent, ethnic, fragmentation in the US localities lead to lower engagement into group activities. Helliwell (1996) addresses the question of differences in social capital between American and Canadian provinces, investigating the extent to which immigration is responsive to higher degrees of trust and income

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equality. My paper builds up on this literature, contributing the distinction between natives and immigrants with respect to participation, while focusing only on civic engagement.

This paper is also closely related to the literature on social assimilation of immigrants. In particular, one of the first attempts to study social assimilation is the work by Dustmann (1996), who analyses immigrants' perception of national identity. While touching upon similar issues, I work with the real actions of individuals, such as membership or participation to demonstrations, rather than subjective measures of assimilation. Another closely related work is by De Palo, Faini, and Venturini (2007), who analyze the extent of social interactions of immigrants, such as the frequency of communication with neighbours and friends.

My analysis of immigrants' participation also touches the literature on culture transmission in general, both across generations and across nations. Transmission across generations is studied by Borjas (1992(a)) who finds that the skills of individuals depend on the skills of the parents and also on the average level of skills of the parents' generation ethnic group, that is, that "ethnic transmission" takes place. Bisin and Verdier (2001) develop a theoretical model of intergenerational culture transmission, in which the acquisition of culture-specific preferences by children depends on culture and social environment in which they live, as well as on the decisions of parents to bring up (culture-) specific qualities in their children. Fernandez and Fogli (2002) consider preference transmission across generations in showing that men whose mothers worked and were educated tend to marry educated women and women who also work. Their 2005 paper addresses culture transmission both across generations and nations, showing how work and fertility behaviour of second generation immigrant women in the US is affected by the work and fertility behaviour of women in the generation of their mothers in their countries of origin. Borjas (1992(b)) shows theoretically and empirically that the national origin of immigrants matters for the welfare recipiency, by analysing how economic characteristics of home country economies affect welfare recipiency of immigrants in the US. Current paper develops an important parallel with this literature by suggesting the ways in which home country participation rates as well as other home country characteristics influence immigrants' participation.

In terms of methodology, my treatment of civic participation follows closely the research on immigrants' participation to welfare programs and also on the fertility choices of immigrants.

For example, immigrants' participation to means-tested entitlement programs in the US is investigated by Borjas and Hilton (1996). They find that immigrants are more likely to receive welfare benefits than natives and that immigrants receive benefits for longer periods of time. Differences in socio-economic characteristics between the two groups account only for a part of

the difference in receiving welfare benefits. Their analysis reveals that cohort, assimilation, and ageing effects matter for participation in the entitlement program. Moreover, participation of newly arriving immigrants is determined by the participation of immigrants of the previous waves, or networks. The research by Riphahn (1999) confirms that age, assimilation, and cohort effects in a large part determine welfare benefits receipt by German guest workers. She also shows the importance of the country of origin for the social assistance receipt.

Along similar lines, Blau (1991) considers fertility choices of immigrant women and fertility assimilation. She analyses immigrant women from high-fertility countries and finds selectivity of women with respect to fertility. Using the framework of Borjas (1987), she shows how, again, cohort effects and the length of residence, as well as the home country characteristics such as the home country average fertility levels, play an important role for fertility choices. Blau also distinguishes between assimilation and disruption hypothesis and finds that both are at work. Fertility of immigrant women is initially disrupted by migration but then it takes up, however, it does not reach the levels of fertility of the source countries. In comparison, Mayer and Riphahn (1999) use count data models to confirm that among immigrants to Germany, it is the assimilation fertility model that is at work. Fernandez and Fogli (2005) continue the analysis of culture transmission for fertility and working hours choices, and find that home country fertility rates and labour market outcomes for women continue determining corresponding outcomes for second- generation immigrant women.

This paper is most similar methodologically to Borjas and Hilton (1996), Blau (1991), and Fernandez and Fogli (2005), as it follows the logic of modelling participation to the welfare state and the fertility choices of immigrants. Likewise, it distinguishes between various effects that are at work, including assimilation, cohort, and ageing effects of immigration, and shows how both home and host country effects determine participation outcomes of immigrants. In addition, it adds to the existing literature by examining yet another aspect of immigrants' life in the host society and of immigrants' behaviour – their civic involvement.

III. The Data

This study uses the data from the European Social Survey (ESS), rounds one and two, and the World Values Survey (WVS), round four, which are publicly available.

To start with, I use the ESS data for the years 2002/2003 and 2004/2005. The ESS is a survey that collects individual-level data in most European Union countries every two years [1]. It

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[1] For detailed information about the data see the ESS documentation available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org and also Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005).

contains the main questionnaire with the same questions asked in each round, as well as rotating modules. The survey covers a wide range of socio-economic questions, including questions on participation in various types of activities.

In this paper, I work with the main questionnaire of the survey (even though a rotating module of the first round contains more questions on civic participation, I am unable to use it, as it is not repeated in the second round). The ESS1 covers 22 countries and 42,359 individuals, of which 4,085 are born outside of country of current residence. Similarly, the ESS2 covers 24 countries and 45,681 individuals, of which 3,924 are foreign-born. The ESS provides information on the individual's country of birth, as well as on the amount of time spent in the country for foreign-born, allowing to distinguish between natives and immigrants.

The sample constructed from the ESS includes both first-generation immigrants and natives. First, both rounds of the ESS are merged and data on males and females who are 14-70 years old are kept. Foreign-born whose country of origin is not specified, whose both parents are born in the destination country, and individuals from the countries of origin that are represented by less than 5 foreign-born in a destination country, are excluded from this sample. The resulting sample includes immigrants from fifty-four countries of origin. Second, the sample is "synchronized" to include only those countries for which the data are available in both rounds (time variability will be needed, as described further). Thus, Italy, Iceland, Israel, Ukraine, Estonia and Slovakia, for which the data are available only in one of the two rounds, are excluded from the sample. In fact, leaving these countries out helps refining the pool of immigrants: for example, over 90% of foreign-born in Estonia and Ukraine are Russians, and they arguably can be considered as international migrants (having mostly moved during the Soviet Union times, they accomplished migration of internal character). Thus, there are 20 countries in the final sample: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. This sample contains 3,889 immigrants, of whom 1,856 were interviewed in ESS Round 1, and 2,033 in ESS Round 2; as well as 62,233 natives.

From the ESS rounds, all further data on socio-economic characteristics of individuals, as well as the area characteristics, are constructed. Full summary statistics and description of variables are provided in the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2.

The dependent variable called "civic participation" takes value one if an individual has reported to have participated in at least one of the following activities in the past 12 months: trade unions (active membership), party (active membership), work for a party, work for a

similar organization or association, signing petitions, boycotting products, or participating to lawful demonstrations. It takes a value zero otherwise. This variable is used for the main analysis throughout the paper. In addition, dummy variables for each type of participation were constructed, for example, membership in a trade union is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual has been an active trade union member for the past 12 months, and zero otherwise. These dependent variables are used only in the first section of the empirical analysis. It is important to stress that only active membership in trade unions and in parties is considered: the survey question allows for responses "being a member", "being an active member", and "not a member". Using only active membership immediately allows focusing on individual actions and choices, while using "being a member" category may artificially increase the pool of "activists" by including those who are members as a result of an institutional setup in a specific country or a sector.

Table 1 summarizes percentages of immigrants involved into various types of civic activities. As can be seen, 48.14% of 3,878 immigrants are engaged civically in some way. Most of those who participate civically do it in a form of signing petitions (48.31% of all civically active), becoming a member of a trade union (39.96%), boycotting certain products (37.96%), or working for some organization or association (23.49%). Additionally, Tables A3 and A4 of the Appendix shed light on the overlap of various forms of the participation. There are few individuals who report to be involved in a particular activity and only in it: for example, of those who work for a party, only 8.05% are not involved in any other activity under consideration, while this number is the highest for trade union membership: 51.34%. The biggest overlap is of working in parties and participating in public demonstrations with signing petitions: it is 60.69% and 60.89% correspondingly. Still, out of those who sign petitions there are 30.17% who are not involved civically in any other way.

Table 1. Types of Participation, Immigrants

Type of participation	% of immigrants involved
Civic participation	48.14
of which	
trade union membership	39.96
party membership	4.91
working for a political party or an action group	7.56
working for another similar organization or association	23.49
signing petition	48.31
taking part in a lawful demonstration	19.62
boycotting certain products	37.96

Further, the average values for these variables are constructed from the ESS separately for immigrants and for natives, by country: the rate of trade union membership, the rate of party membership, etc, and the rate of civic participation in general. To draw the parallel with the participation rates of natives in host countries, Table A6 focuses on a destination country. From this table, Sweden and Norway are the countries with highest civic participation rates of natives. At the same time, immigrants in these countries are also the most active as compared to immigrants in other European countries[2]. Countries with lowest participation rates of natives are Greece, Portugal, and Hungary; and also in Hungary there are the lowest participation rates of immigrants. Figure A1 illustrates a high degree of positive correlation between participation of natives and immigrants by country.

In addition, the World Values Survey (WVS) is used to construct home country participation rates for immigrants. The WVS is conducted in four waves since 1981 and covers more than 80 countries. I work with the last round of the WVS (years 1999-2002). WVS contains the same set of questions on participation and civic involvement of various types as the ESS, allowing to create synchronized measures of participation in countries that are home countries to immigrants from ESS. Table A7 of the Appendix provides summary statistics of participation rates with the focus on the source country. Out of 54 emigration countries in the sample the lowest rates of civic participation of non-migrants in origin countries are in Turkey (0.186), while the highest are, again, in Sweden (0.945). At the same time, comparing the behaviour of immigrants and their country nationals at home, it is difficult to see immediately whether there is a selection of immigrants in terms of participation. For example, immigrants from Turkey are much more active than their country nationals (rate of civic participation is 0.460), as well as Moroccans (0.481 abroad versus 0.211 at home), while immigrants from Russia and Albania, who are among the largest immigration groups in the sample, are less active than their country nationals.

VI. Empirical Strategy and Results

4.1. Determinants of Civic Participation. Home or Host Culture?

I start the empirical analysis by exploring what determines civic participation and its various forms, and to what extent home countries' participation cultures affect participation of those who migrated.

First, the following model is estimated:

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[2] I checked that Swedish in Norway and Norwegians in Sweden represent no more than 5% of the corresponding immigrant population.

$$\text{Particip}_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 \text{HomeParticip}_k + \varepsilon_{ijk} , \qquad (1)$$

where Particip_{ijk} is a measure of civic participation coded on a 0-1 basis of an individual i residing in country j who migrated from country k. X_i is a set of individual socio-economic characteristics, and HomeParticip_k is the average participation rate in the home country. Probit estimation is chosen because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.

Individual socio-economic characteristics considered are the number of members in a household, age, age squared, gender, years of completed education, whether an individual is married, been divorced, individual income, being an employee and being unemployed. A prior expectation would be that the level of civic engagement increases with age but at a decreasing rate, and that the larger number of years of schooling would enhance participation. The latter is due to the fact that individuals with more education are more likely to have stronger interest in and knowledge about the working of civic society, as well as about their rights and opportunities for participation (Bueker, 2005).

Individual income is expected to have positive impact on participation, as it may serve as a resource for participation. Also, higher income may signify that an immigrant has a more stable position in a society and can also devote more time to participation. Likewise, employees would be expected to participate more than self-employed and employed in family business (with respect to trade union membership, though, higher participation of employees would be for the reason of a more immediate access to these structures). Unemployed immigrants would be expected to have less resources to devote to participation.

Two area characteristics are also included, as it has been shown that area heterogeneity and neighbourhoods play an important role in determining certain behavioural outcomes (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Borjas, 1992). These are mean area income (calculated on a regional rather than country basis), and a dummy equal to one if an immigrant lives in urban rather than rural area.

Table 2.1 summarizes estimation results. All specifications include correction of standard errors for clustering at the country of origin level, since the major variable of interest varies with the country of origin only[3]. Column one contains marginal effects of the baseline specification. As expected, propensity to participate rises with age but at a decreasing rate, as well as with the number of completed years of schooling. There is some weak evidence that females tend to participate less than males. Those with higher incomes are more likely to be civically involved in

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[3] Alternatively, clustering at the country of destination was also applied, for overall similar results.

some way. Potential endogeneity problem with the income variable is most likely not to be too severe, as I consider the types of participation of political and civic rather than directly economic character, and also because there may be not only "individual", but also "social" benefits from such involvement (La Ferrara, 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). Working as employees (versus self-employed and employed in family business) leads to more participation, while unemployed are less civically active. In line with previous studies (such as Dustmann, 1996), being married has a negative impact on participation, as it arguably makes it less stimulating for an immigrant to plunge into a life of a receiving society and to assimilate. However, this result is not robust as will be shown further. Living in urban areas seems to present better opportunities for civic engagement too, while mean area income does not seem to play a role.

The major variable of my interest, home country rate of civic participation, exhibits a positive statistically significant effect on civic participation of those who migrated. Starting at the sample mean and using the corresponding coefficient from probit estimation, I calculate that an increase in the level of home country participation rate (across countries) by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the probability of civic participation in a destination country by 2.61 percentage points, which also accounts for approximately 13% of the variation in home country participation across countries of origin. This suggests that participation culture of a home country is transmitted in the form of higher civic participation abroad. This is also in line with the idea that high culture of civic involvement at home generates experiences that can be built on and can be considered as a resource that determines further participation (Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2006).

[insert Table 2.1 about here]

Additionally, to disentangle the home country effect for different forms of participation, Table 2.2 shows the same regression estimated separately for each form of participation. Here, dependent variables are coded on a zero-one basis if an individual takes part in a certain activity (such as trade union membership, working for an organization, etc); independent variables of interest are corresponding rates of participation in the same activities in home countries. The most robust effect that holds almost for all types of participation is that of education and income, and it is those more educated and more well-off who tend to participate more in all types of activities, except trade unions. For trade union outcomes, it is being an employee (versus self-employed or working for a family business) and employed, as well as a relatively older male, that increases the probability of becoming of trade union member. Unemployment status also precludes from becoming a party member and from signing petitions.

As to the home country effect, it matters for certain types of participation, but not for all. Moreover, home participating culture may have positive as well as negative impact on different forms of participation of immigrants. For example, those who come from strong cultures of trade unions, boycotting products and signing petitions, tend to carry higher participation propensities in these activities across borders. However, there is a mild evidence that working for a party at home translates even into negative propensity to work for a party abroad. Explanations for the negative impact of home practises may be found in Bueker (2005), who argues that unpleasant previous experiences that resulted in disappointments or fear of governmental structures and processes do translate into lower participation, while positive experiences do not necessarily result in more participation. This is the case of working for a party, which also might have been imposed in certain countries of origin (such as the countries of former Communist Block) rather than stemmed from a voluntary choice, hence, as a result, party work is renounced in the immigration country. At the same time, either a direct experience of growing up in a culture with high rates of party membership, demonstrating, and participating to other organizations, or looking backwards and observing high participation in such activities at home, does not significantly affect participation of immigrants in these activities abroad. The insignificant home country effect for organizational participation may be due to the fact that many immigrants are involved in migrants' associations of various types (see POLITIS Reports 2006), while this form of civic involvement is irrelevant for them back at home. Some of the insignificant results here, however, may also technically stem from the fact that dependent variables (such as party membership) contain too many zeros (only 2.36% of respondents are party members). Thus, for a more meaningful analysis, I continue working with the measure of civic participation that equals to one if an individual undertakes at least one of the activities.

[Insert Table 2.2 about here]

In the next columns of Table 2.1 I explore other specifications of equation (1). In column 2, three more variables are added: language proficiency (a dummy equal to one if an individual mentions any official language of a country of residence, or English, among languages spoken at home), a dummy equal to one for individuals who have one of the parents being a national of the country of residence, and a dummy equal to one if an immigrant has the citizenship of the country of residence. From column 2, there is little evidence that language ability enhances participation, even though this may be due to the data sampling and the fact that interviewees were able to answer the questionnaire without the help of an interpreter, thus possessing at least a minimum knowledge of the country of residence language. On the other hand, naturalization clearly improves participation outcomes. This is in line with the idea that acquiring citizenship

"relaxes the constraints" by which immigrants are bound, allowing them to become full-fledged members of the hosting society (for example, in Estonia, membership to political parties is restricted only to nationals of Estonia, while in Austria third-country nationals may participate to demonstrations, but not organize them; Cyrus et al, 2006). At the same time, being a citizen may additionally suggest that an individual has spent a significant amount of time in the country, gained a permanent view on her stay, and thus became aware of and interested in opportunities for civic engagement[4].

Column 3 explores whether educational attainment of parents and of the partner may play a role (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005), but there is no evidence for that. The degree of home country civic participation is robust to both these specifications.

In column 4, I include more labour market individual characteristics. These are total hours worked per week including the overtime (I expect that those who work longer hours would have less time to devote to civic engagement), the skill level, and the sector in which an individual works. Four broad occupational categories are distinguished: manufacturing and construction, agriculture, trade and services, and caring for individuals (the latter being among the top occupation for migrant women). Excluded category is all other occupations (such as governmental workers, teachers and medical doctors). These variables are constructed from the ESS survey question on individual's occupation, which is coded based on ISO standard for occupations. From the same question I construct variables for being a skilled or an unskilled worker (I also experimented with constructing variables such as "white collar" and "blue collar"; "management", "non-profit sector" etc for similar results). Overall, there is no evidence that skilled or unskilled workers differ significantly in their degree of civic involvement. At the same time, there is a clear distinction by sectors. Those working in agriculture and trade and services participate significantly less, perhaps, due to rather limited opportunities for collective action as compared to those who work in other sectors, but also due to a lower degree of unionization of these sectors. However, there is no evidence that those involved in construction and manufacturing, where unionization is higher, or caring for other people, exhibit more civic participation than others.

Finally, in the last column of Table 2, I add a second variable of interest, the host country rate of civic participation, and estimate the following specification:

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[4] The importance of naturalization is well documented in the labour economics literature. Chiswick (1978) pioneers the area of research on naturalization's implication for immigrant assimilation in terms of earnings, finding that American naturalized foreign-born males earn more than non- naturalized, but that the effect of naturalization becomes smaller once years since migration are taken into account. More recently, Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002) find that naturalization accelerates the process of assimilation in terms of earnings, and has an impact beyond and above mere "length of stay" effect. Significant impact of naturalization remains even when they control for individual unobserved characteristics that may lead to self-selection of the most able towards acquiring citizenship.

$$Particip_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 HomeParticip_k + \beta_3 HostParticip_j + \varepsilon_{ijk} , \qquad (2)$$

where all variables are like in (1), and, additionally, $HostParticip_j$ is the level of civic participation of natives in the destination country.

Is it the home or the host culture of participation that affects individual participation of immigrants? From the last column of Table 2, I find evidence in support of a hypothesis that higher participation outcomes of natives translate into higher participation outcomes of immigrants too, with the marginal effect of host country participation rate having the largest magnitude in this specification. The host country effect is stronger and larger that the home one. Using the estimated probit coefficients from this regression, I compute that, starting from the sample mean, an increase of one standard deviation in home participation rate (across countries of origin) leads to 2.49 percentage points increase in the probability of civic involvement, while an increase of one standard deviation in host country participation rate (across countries of destination) is associated with a 20.91 percentage points increase in the probability of civic involvement, that is, more than an eight-fold effect. To appreciate the size of this effect even more, compare it to acquisition of citizenship: naturalization increases the probability of civic involvement by 9.43 percentage points, which is one of the most sizeable effects, but which is still twice as small as the effect of the destination country's participation culture.

At this point I find no evidence that the host country participating culture crowds out the home effect. A transnational mechanism seems to be in place, according to which immigrants develop various forms of belonging, identities, and transmigrants' community building, relating both to the home and host societies (see literature on transnationalism, such as Glick Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton, 1992).

The next question to ask is whether the length of stay, as well as the age at migration and migration cohorts matter. The following section addresses these questions.

4.2. Immigrants Compared to Natives. Assimilation versus Culture Transmission

In this section I address the differences between immigrants and natives with respect to participation. Also, I evaluate the importance of age, cohort, and assimilation effects for immigrants' participation.

To start with, Table 3, columns 1-2 offer a comparison of participation outcomes of natives (column 1) and of immigrants (column 2), where for comparability only individual and

area characteristics are included. These are the same as in Table 2 column 5, with additionally included dummy variables for religion denomination[5].

First, note some differences in the impact of individual characteristics on natives and on immigrants when determining participation. As expected, immigrants' years of schooling have a slightly lower effect on participation than the years of schooling of natives, differences being due to the country-specific aspects of schooling (Chiswick, 1978). With respect to income, the positive effect is twice as high for natives as for immigrants. The probability of being civically inactive is almost twice as high for unemployed immigrants as for unemployed natives, suggesting that unemployment spells have more severe overall implication for immigrants than for natives. The number of household members does not seem to play a role for immigrants' participation, while its increasing number impedes participation of natives. Of note is a lower propensity to participate among both Catholic natives and immigrants, while there is no strong evidence for participation differences among other denominations: natives with Orthodox denomination tend to be slightly more civically active, but it is immigrants with Protestant denomination who exhibit more participation. There is no evidence that Muslims, Jews, and other Christians participate significantly differently from an average immigrant or native. Furthermore, there are some differences by the employment sector: immigrants employed in agriculture are twice less likely to be civically involved than natives, who are also less prone to participate if they are working in this sector. At the same time, while immigrants in manufacturing and construction do not differ with respect to participation from the average, natives in these sectors are less active as well. Finally, if for natives participation outcomes do not seem to depend on the area of residence, immigrants in urban areas are more active that those in the rural ones.

[insert Table 3 about here]

I now complete the analysis by including lengths of stay and cohort effects for immigrants. Traditionally, the immigrant assimilation hypothesis has been investigated by considering whether the years since migration variable, or duration in the destination, matter for the immigrants' adjustment. Most commonly, this has been done within the synthetic cohorts framework, originally proposed by Borjas (1985). Several studies (Blau, 1991; Borjas, 1996; Riphahn 1999) employed this methodology to identify separately age at migration, cohort, and overall assimilation effects, and showed that these effects have a strong prediction power for immigrant's performance in the receiving country. The data at hand, which is a succession of

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[5] Home country average participation rate is not included for natives, as it would result in a reflection problem (Manski, 1993). For comparability, in Table 3 column 2 only, both home and host participation variables are omitted for immigrants too.

cross-sections (two waves of the ESS survey: 2002-2003, and 2004-2005) allow constructing a synthetic panel and capture the impact of age at migration, cohort effect (year of migration), and the assimilation effect (length of stay), in addition to the age variable. It should be noted that this methodology is superior to the use of simple cross section methodology (such as in Chiswick, 1978), as it reduces the bias due to the static nature of a cross section. However, it has been recognized that the synthetic cohort approach also has its limitations in that it may contain survivor bias. Most recent studies have been relying on superior longitudinal data which allow overcoming the problem of survivors bias and cohort heterogeneity (for example, Hu, 2000). But even the longitudinal data are unable to overcome all problems, for example, to account for structural change in migration absorption (Beenstock, Chiswick and Paltiel, 2005). It has been also recognized that tests of assimilation with any data (cross-section, synthetic cohort, or panel), may not be ideal (Ibid). I proceed with the synthetic cohort approach bearing in mind above-mentioned limitations when interpreting the results.

Column 3 of Table 3 contains main results of this study. The length of stay in the country clearly plays a significant role in determining participation: those who have stayed more than five years in a country have an unambiguous inclination towards civic involvement. This is a much expected result, as more time spent in a destination country allows learning more about the opportunities for civic participation, receiving information about and participating to networks of natives and immigrants, acquiring more social capital (Liang, 1994; Van Londen and Phalet, 2006), and developing a perspective of staying in a host country. The negative sign of the immigration year suggests that more recently arriving cohorts are less active, thus implying a declining "quality" (Borjas, 1996) of immigrants with respect to participation. This may also be an indirect evidence of the fact that recent arrivals are more due to economic rather than political reasons and are of a temporary rather than permanent character. At the same time, there is no evidence that age at migration significantly matters for participation: those who migrated in childhood or adolescence are neither more nor less active than those migrated at a later stage. In line with previous studies, such as Dustmann (1994), Chiswick (1991), language is also playing an important role in predicting immigrants' outcomes in the destination country.

Finally, all these effects taken into account, the insignificant coefficient of the home country average participation suggests that culture transmission is not robust to the inclusion of these effects, while culture assimilation with respect to participation, as suggested by the coefficients on the years in the host country and host country average participation, takes place. Host country participation is also jointly significant with the length of stay variables (joint

significant test's statistic chi(10) = 66.93, Prob>chi2 = 0.000)[6]. The impact of the host culture is stronger and more robust than the impact of the home participating culture. The effect of an increase of one standard deviation of the host country's participation rate (calculated starting from the sample mean and using coefficients of probit estimation such as in Table 3 column 3) on the probability of immigrants' participation equals 15.79 percentage points. As expected, it is smaller than the effect I obtained when time and cohort effects were not taken into account, but still very sizeable. This effect compares only to the 17.3 percentage point decrease in probability of being civically active for immigrants who become employed in agricultural sector and to 10.8 percentage point decrease for immigrants who become unemployed. Those who work as employees, ceteris paribus, have a 8.5 percentage points higher probability of becoming civically involved than those who work in family business or who are self-employed; an effect half the size of the effect of the host country's participation culture. Citizenship acquisition raises the probability of civic participation by 6.4 percentage points, an effect almost two and a half times smaller than the host country's participation influence. In practical terms, the effect of one standard deviation increase in the host country participation rate (across host countries) equal to 15.79 percentage points increase in the probability of civic involvement means that, for example, an immigrant who chooses to go to France rather than to Hungary will have about 15 percentage points higher probability of engaging civically[7]. As another example, if among sampled 62234 natives 6223 more individuals were involved civically across all sampled countries, the probability of civic engagement for any immigrant, ceteris paribus, would have been 10.21 percentage points higher.

V. Robustness

In this section I explore further the robustness of the obtained results. I perform a sensitivity analysis under which certain immigrant groups are excluded from estimations; employ an alternative estimation technique; and address the issue of immigrants' self-selection and reference groups. Table 4 contains this section's results.

5.1 Omitting Certain Groups of Immigrants

One of the very interesting, but also problematic features of my sample is the fact that foreign-born individuals come from all over the world. Thus, I am comparing participation rates

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[6] I also considered a specification in which interaction terms between home, host culture and length of stay and age at migration were included. In such specification, interaction terms are insignificant, but independent terms have the same signs and similar magnitudes. Results are available upon request.

[7] Hungary has the rate of natives' civic participation which is close to the mean rate across countries; France is about one standard deviation apart.

of Canadians and Moroccans, Swiss and Ukrainians, to name just a few groups. While distinguishing different migration patterns and migration histories is beyond the scope of this study, in this section I are attempting to insure comparability of immigrants and see whether previous results hold if certain immigrant groups are omitted. I considered one at a time exclusion of the following immigrant groups: those born in the EU countries and residing in the EU countries different from the country of birth; nationals of geographically European countries; nationals from post-communist regime countries; immigrants from predominantly non-Christian cultures. I also tried excluding those immigrants who came to live in a country more than 20 years ago, obtaining quite comparable results. In Table 4 column 1 I present a probit estimation based on the sample where the omitted immigrant group is the one from industrialized countries: the EU-15, Switzerland, USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan. The resulting immigrant sample consists of 1,738 individuals. While most of the coefficients have magnitudes and signs as before, variables "being an employee" and "working in trade or services" lose significance. As before, culture assimilation, as captured by the length of stay and participation outcomes of natives, matters significantly for participation of immigrants.

[insert Table 4 about here]

5.2 Alternative Estimation Technique: Using Count Data Model

In the previous sections I worked with the dependent variable coded on a zero-one basis, where one meant involvement in any type of civic activity versus zero for non-involvement. Here, the idea is to consider an integer dependent variable, which is a count of the number of civic activities an individual undertakes (the distribution of the number of activities is summarized in Table A6). I fit the Poisson maximum-likelihood regression for the specification such as the one in the previous section (see Mayer and Riphahn (1999) for similar applications and elaboration on potential caveats)[8]. Table 4 column 2 contains regression results, as well as the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics for this estimation which suggests that using Poisson model is justified. Comparing these results to Table 3 column 3 I see that, overall, there is a strong affinity between them, although the coefficients from the Poisson regression and the marginal effects from probit estimation are not directly comparable. Language variable gains significance, and host country participation continues playing an important role in predicting civic participation outcomes of immigrants.

5.3 Accounting for Immigrants' Self-Selection: Matching on Propensity Score

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[8] Ordered probit was also considered, for almost identical results which are available on request.

Up till now I have been working with average participation rates by country of origin and by country of destination. A major objection to this is that the average level of observed compatriots' participation back at home, as well of the natives in general, may be of limited relevance for immigrants. As immigrants may be self-selected in terms of participation, their reference group is most probably that part of the society from which they originate rather than the home society at large. In the same fashion, a reference group may be a part of the host society, rather than the whole society. Thus, the major robustness check concerns with the issue of representability of an immigrant's reference group. The idea here is to construct relevant reference participation rates for each immigrant, by groups of similar compatriots and of similar natives, rather than by country of origin and a host country as a whole. Thus, for example, if an immigrant is an educated female in her fifties, an ideal reference group would be a pool of educated females in their fifties back at home. In addition to being more appropriate, consideration of participating rates based on reference groups also increases variation of the variable in question.

Appropriate reference groups of compatriots who did not migrate are created by matching immigrants (of the ESS) to the compatriots (from the WVS) with similar characteristics. The match is performed on the propensity scores, using the matching method standard in the evaluation literature. The idea behind matching is the comparison of outcomes (in this case, civic participation) of treated and control groups (in this case, migrants and non-migrants), who are as similar as possible. But since matching individuals on n-dimensional vector of characteristics is hardly feasible for large n, characteristics of individuals of each group are summarized into a single-index variable, called propensity score, and matching is performed on this variable (Becker and Ichino, 2002[9]). An advantage of using matching as a solution for self-selection problem is that there is no assumption put on whether migrants are self-selected from the lower or from the higher end of the participation outcomes distribution.

First, for each country of origin, emigrants (from the ESS) and non-emigrants (from the WVS) are pooled together, and a conditional probability (propensity score) of receiving a treatment (immigration) given pre-treatment characteristics is calculated. The sample is further split into equally spaced intervals of the propensity score, and within each interval it is ensured that the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ. Also, within each interval, it is tested that the means of each characteristic do not differ between treated and control units, that is, a necessary condition for the balancing hypothesis is ensured[10] (for details of the

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[9] I also work with pscore.ado program for Stata written by Becker and Ichino.
[10] Technically, reference groups created in this way contain individuals with different characteristics but with the same or close values of the propensity scores, rather than individuals with exactly the same characteristics.

methodology, see Becker and Ichino, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; and Imbens, 2000). Once the most comparable sample counterparts are selected from the group of non-emigrants for each emigrant, average participation rates are calculated by groups of non-emigrants with similar characteristics. In practical terms this amounts to calculating averages by blocks, or intervals, within which the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ.

Matching migrants, for whom the data come from the ESS, to their compatriots, the data for whom come from the WVS, requires a lot of prior data refining and ensuring data comparability. For example, the WVS contains information on educational attainment, which is coded differently from the educational attainment reported in the ESS. Thus, for comparability, two variables were constructed: a dummy equal to one if an individual had any amount of schooling not higher than completed high school, and a dummy equal to one if an individual received any amount of university or college education (educational group being left out is individuals with vocational training). Also, to ensure that a match is found for all migrants, three age groups were created: individuals below twenty-five years of age, from twenty-five to forty-five, and above forty-five (other alternative groups were considered, but the best matches are found if the sample is split into these three age groups). Unfortunately, ESS contains almost no information on pre-migration characteristics, thus making impossible the match of individuals from rural/urban areas or on income/social class characteristics (matching on current incomes does not seem to be appropriate). Finally, as there are fifty-four countries of origin in the sample, various propensity score specifications were tried, with the idea that the balancing property should uniformly hold for the same propensity score specification across all countries. Given these data and comparability limitations, the estimated propensity score specification is quite parsimonious, and includes only age, gender, and education parameters. Other individual characteristics, such as marital status, were considered in the specification, but they fail to produce propensity scores satisfying the balancing property in all countries of the sample. For an example of propensity score estimation and average participation rates of non-emigrants calculated within propensity score blocks, see Appendix, Table A8.

As a result of matching, each immigrant was assigned a specific reference participation rate of compatriots, depending on his or her individual characteristics. To appreciate the difference, if previously used value of home participation average was 0.444 for all Albanian immigrants, matching resulted in assigning four different values to four groups of Albanian immigrants, ranging from 0.297 to 0.578, depending on their age, gender, and education.

In the same fashion, each immigrant was matched to similar natives in destination countries and participation rates by groups of similar immigrants/natives were constructed. For

comparability, the propensity score specification was chosen to be the same as in the emigrants/non-leavers match, and included age, gender, and education parameters.

Table 4 column 3 presents estimation results. Here, home and host participation rates are those calculated based on the propensity score matching. As these variables have been generated through regression analysis (propensity score specification), for this regression bootstrapping is applied in order to ensure proper inferences and to cope with the generated regressors' problem; hence, bootstrapped standard errors are reported. The results presented in previous sections stand to this robustness check: recalculated coefficients are all very similar to those observed before. Home country participation rates remain insignificant. Host participation rates continue playing an important role in determining participation outcomes of immigrants. The coefficient on this variable is smaller in magnitude than before, which is not a very much expected result, however, its significance and the same sign point out to its robustness to the use of this alternative technique.

VI. Home and Host Country Effects

Finally, in this section I investigate how other country effects may influence individual participation outcomes, as well as address another critique of the previous analysis regarding the inclusion of participation rates by country into regressions. The concern is that, included in the individual-level regressions, these rates require the relationship between the home and the host country effects and the individual participation outcomes be linear, and may not only reflect the true effect of home and host participation culture, but rather pick up all other unobservable country characteristics. On the other hand, however, including only dummies for the countries of origin does not allow distinguishing between various country effects. For example, in addition to participating culture and previous civic experiences, country dummies may also capture the "reversibility" of migration: if re-migration is complicated for political, geographical, or other reasons, this may have an impact on integration decision of individuals (Bueker, 2005). In order to investigate country effects in depth, the following solution can be implemented: first use country dummies in estimations, and then regress the coefficients obtained on country dummies on home country indicators (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005; Blau, 1991). The analysis in this paper is complicated by the fact that there are two reference countries: home and host, while the proposed two-steps procedure can be used to analyse the country effects of one set of countries at a time. Thus, I first proceed with the analysis of home country effects, and then repeat the procedure for a similar analysis of host-country effects. The two-step estimation is performed as follows. First, estimate a model such as:

$$\text{Particip}_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 d_j + \beta_3 d_k + \varepsilon_{ijk} \qquad (3)$$

where d_k is a dummy for a country of origin; d_j is a country of destination, other variables are like in (1). And second, estimate

$$\beta_{3k} = \alpha + \delta_1 \text{HomceParticip}_k + \delta_2 Y_k + \varepsilon_k \qquad (4)$$

where β_{3k} is a vector of home country dummy coefficients obtained in the previous step, and Y_k is a set of other potentially relevant country characteristics.

To start with, of interest is to include only the civic participation rates by country of origin in the second stage, in order to understand how much of the variation in the overall home country effects is explained by the civic participation rates. Further, of interest is also to include other potentially important country characteristics and see whether they have any impact on the participation outcomes of immigrants. In particular, I control for the GDP per capita, secondary school enrolment rates[11], migration rates (net migration rates per 1000 of population, average 2000-2005), and whether the sending country is industrialized or not (similar characteristics are considered in Blau, 1991). Also, I control for religious diversity of a country by including an index of religious fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) show that participation in social activities is lower in more fragmented racial and ethnic communities; Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004), focus on the importance of religion as a transmitted feature). Lastly, previous research has shown the value of institutions and political practises of societies with respect to participation. For example, Finifter and Finifter (1989) argue that higher rates of participation are found among those immigrants who had previous exposure to democratic systems, while Fennema and Tillie (1999) suggest that bad previous experiences may generate lack of trust in the government and impede participation even after migration. Thus, I also include an empowerment rights index, which is an aggregate index of freedom of movement, freedom of speech, degree of protection of workers' rights, political participation, and freedom of religion indicators (I tried to include these indices separately, but due to high degree of collinearity between them most of the coefficients are rendered insignificant). For data definitions and sources, see Table A1[12].

The starting point is Table 5-1, with the decomposition of home country effects. Results for the equation (3) are in panel A. After controlling for all individual characteristics and for the country of residence, for certain countries, though not for all, countries' effect continues bearing

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[11] I also considered literacy rates for similar results. Even though I are aware of the recently proposed measures of labour force quality based on the international mathematics and science scores (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000), I am unable to use them as they are not available for all countries of the sample.

[12] Only most recent values of home country variables are used. Ideally, I should have used the values at the time of migration, but collecting such data is complicated as immigrants come from 54 countries at different times, and much of the data would be missing.

importance in determining immigrants' participation (panel A). Only some origin-specific dummies are significant, but all of them are significant jointly.

[insert Table 5-1 about here]

Panel B contains results for the second step of the estimation, (4). To cope with the small sample size problem and its implication for inferences, standard errors were bootstrapped using normal approximation method; number of bootstrap replications being 1000. In the first column, only the host country average participation rates are included in estimation. The coefficient of home participation is highly significant, and pseudo R2 for this regression is 0.14, suggesting that a relatively high proportion of the variation in the home country dummy coefficients is explained by home participation rates (for similar inferences, see Fernandez and Fogli, 2005). This also serves as a justification for including average participation rates into the individual regressions of the previous sections. Figure A2 of the Appendix provides a regression fit corresponding to column 1 of Panel B, showing which countries lie above and below the regression line, and which ones fit into the 95% confidence interval of this estimation. Low home country participation has especially severe implications for participation of immigrants from countries such as Ukraine, Albania, Russia, while high participation rates in countries such as Finland and Switzerland translate into higher participation abroad.

In column 2, other country characteristics are included. Overall fit highly improves. There is little evidence, however, to the fact that civic freedoms at home, higher enrolment rates or higher GDP per capita improve participation outcomes. In contrast, it is revealed that most active immigrants come from industrialized countries which are also immigration countries (with positive migration rates). Coming from a country with high religious fragmentation has a negative impact on participation outcomes.

In trying to understand further these results, I analysed correlation between country variables, and found that civic freedoms variable is highly correlated with the variable "industrialized", and with GDP per capita. All in all, the "absence" of the significant coefficient on home country participation rates is a result in itself, as it suggests that culture transmission in terms of participation is not happening. At the same time, other country of origin characteristics continue determining participation outcomes of migrants, and most participating are those from industrialized immigration societies (which are more likely also those with higher GDP per capita and higher respect for civic freedoms), and which are not highly fragmentised religiously.

[insert Table 5-2 about here]

The same analysis is repeated for the destination country effects. I estimate:

$$\text{Particip}_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 d_j + \beta_3 d_k + \varepsilon_{ijk} \qquad (5)$$

where d_k is a dummy for a country of origin; d_j is a dummy for a country of destination, other variables are like in (1). And further, estimate

$$\beta_{2j} = \alpha + \delta_1 \text{HostParticip}_j + \delta_2 Y_j + \varepsilon_j \qquad (6)$$

In parallel with (3), vector Y_j is a vector of host country characteristics, which include GDP per capita, migration rates (net migration rates per 1000 of population, average 2000-2005), religious diversity, and empowerment rights index. In this estimation, secondary school enrolment and a dummy for whether a country is industrialized are omitted because of the lack of cross-country variation in these indicators.

Results are presented in Table 5-2. In a similar fashion, many but not all country dummy coefficients are significant (panel A), and all are significant jointly, suggesting that host country setting also impacts participation outcomes of immigrants (see also Figure A2 for the regression fit). Panel B, column 1, shows that the host country culture of participation matters for participation of immigrants. The coefficient on the observed natives participation is significant and very large in magnitude. In addition, this variable alone explains 86% of the variation in the host country dummy coefficient, suggesting that immigrants do pick up on the participating culture of the society in which they live. Likewise, it is the sole significant variable in a regression where other country variables are included (column 2). This coefficient stays robust to the inclusion of the host country degree of civic freedoms, suggesting that for immigrants, observed behaviour of natives is more important than the regime lived through. Neither civic freedoms in the receiving countries, nor GDP per capita, degree of religious fragmentation or net migration seem to influence the behaviour of immigrants, rather, the effect of these variables, if any, works through the civic behaviour of natives – and by observing what natives do, immigrants tend to do the same.

VII. Conclusions

Various studies recently have shown that the quality of public life and the strength of democracy depend on the strength of the civic involvement, but also that the participation of individuals in the life of their communities has been decreasing over the past. At the same time, as the proportion of immigrants is growing, it is the immigrants who increasingly determine the scope, shape, and directions of the civic life of receiving communities. In addition, it is also the electorate that is becoming less representative of native population (Kollwelter, 2005).

Thus, the research on civic participation of immigrants bears twofold importance. On the one hand, it can help understanding how current civic participation of immigrants might predispose the future civic and political life of Europe. On the other hand, it can suggest the degree of current immigrants' integration, civic assimilation, development of civic solidarity and interconnectedness between natives and immigrants.

To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to empirically assess civic participation outcomes of immigrants, and to understand what cultural mechanisms are at work during the formation of civic participation outcomes. Methodologically standing in line with the literature on the processes of culture transmission and immigrants' assimilation in terms of working hours, wages, and fertility, this paper broadens our understanding of yet another type of immigrants' behaviour in receiving societies – their civic involvement. The major findings can be summarized as follows.

First, of note is the fact that factors determining participation vary depending on the type of civic engagement. While, for example, trade union membership, signing petitions and boycotting products abroad is positively linked to the level of similar activities at home, it is not the case for other forms of participation. Moreover, higher levels of involvement with parties in home countries may translate into lower propensity to participate in parties abroad, suggesting that potential negative experiences with these structures in home societies discourage further participation in them after migration.

Second, when compared to natives, civic participation outcomes of immigrants are determined by rather similar factors. The main difference is that unemployment has twice as negative effect on immigrants as on natives when it comes to participation, while income increase for immigrants has twice as lower impact on participation as income increase for natives. Immigrants' years of schooling have a slightly lower effect on participation than the years of schooling of natives, too.

There is a strong evidence that naturalization enhances overall propensity to participate civically. Citizenship acquisition relaxes participation constrains, offers more possibilities and opportunities for involvement, and at the same time signifies that an immigrant spent a considerable amount of time in a country, developed a prospect of staying in it, and acquired social capital necessary for participation. Indeed, another strong finding is that regardless of the age at migration, the longer an individual stays in a country, the more he or she is prone to be civically involved.

Educated, relatively better off, and employed individuals are also more ready to devote time and energy to civic activities. Potentially, they are also those who have more stability in the

receiving society, as well as more resources, such as time and energy, to devote to such activities. Being an employee (rather than self-employed or employed in family business), creates more opportunities for collective action (especially trade union membership) and thus enhances participation too, although this is true only for the employees coming form industrialized countries. At the same time, there is no difference in participation outcomes between low-skilled and highly-skilled workers. Also, while agriculture, trade and services workers participate less (again, perhaps, due to less opportunities for collective action and due to lower unionisation of these sectors), there is no evidence that those in manufacturing and construction tend to participate more. Thus, when there are less opportunities for participation, participation is impeded, but when such opportunities are more readily available, it is not necessarily enhanced.

When delving deeper into testing culture transmission and culture assimilation hypothesis, I find only limited evidence in support of the hypothesis of culture transmission in terms of participation. Consequently, neither is transnationalism strong enough. Much stronger and much more robust is the effect of participation assimilation, which takes place along with the overall assimilation of immigrants. On the other hand, this does not signify that home country does not play any role in determining participation outcomes. To the contrary, there is evidence that it is those from industrialized, net immigration countries, where the degree of religious fragmentation is low, and, potentially, civic freedoms are more respected, who tend to be more civically active. Thus, an interesting conclusion is that, while participating culture per se is not translated across borders, it is the experience of living in a less (more) economically and democratically advanced country, which potentially generates lower (higher) trust in the working of the civic society and leads to lower (higher) active civic engagement at home, that is carried across the borders. In contrast, it is the behaviour of natives, rather than economic and political regime lived through, that seems to have the strongest impact on immigrants' participation. It is by observing by what natives do, that immigrants tend to do the same.

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Table 2.1. Determinants of Civic Participation: Basic Probit Analysis

Dep. Var: Civic Participation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.015***	0.017***	0.024***	0.022***	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of people in a HH	0.016*	0.015	0.014	0.015	0.015
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Years of schooling	0.022***	0.021***	0.019***	0.019***	0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	-0.038	-0.045**	-0.074***	-0.032	-0.028
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Married	-0.077***	-0.070**	-0.192***	-0.056*	-0.047*
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Divorced or separated	-0.033	-0.033	-0.048	-0.035	-0.058
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.093)	(0.045)	(0.041)
Income	0.014**	0.012**	0.010	0.007	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Employee	0.070***	0.075***	0.151***	0.038	0.046*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Unemployed	-0.109***	-0.112***	-0.110**	-0.130***	-0.141***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Mean area income	0.058***	0.070***	0.076***	0.069***	-0.030
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Living in an urban area	0.024	0.028	0.007	0.036*	0.035*
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Home civic participation rate	0.127*	0.169**	0.160*	0.138*	0.121*
	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.074)	(0.065)
Language ability		-0.003	0.054	0.011	0.049
		(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.031)
Parents born in country		0.029	0.063	0.022	0.031
		(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Citizen		0.139***	0.153***	0.131***	0.094***
		(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.021)
Total hours worked (week)				-0.001	-0.000
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Manufacturing/Construction				-0.104	-0.095
				(0.093)	(0.097)
Agriculture				-0.216***	-0.212**
				(0.084)	(0.084)
Trade/Services				-0.063*	-0.077**
				(0.033)	(0.034)
Carer				-0.029	-0.035
				(0.040)	(0.039)
Skilled worker				0.082	0.072
				(0.088)	(0.091)
Unskilled worker				0.074	0.071
				(0.099)	(0.104)
Partner's education			0.015		
			(0.013)		
Father's education			-0.018		
			(0.011)		
Mother's education			0.007		
			(0.012)		
Host Civic Participation					1.180***
					(0.132)
Wald(df) chi2 / PseudoR	(13)247.96/0.08	(16)297.53/0.09	(19)300.35/0.11	(23)386.86/0.09	24(830)/0.13
Observations	2961	2956	1729	2624	2624

Reported are marginal effects of probit estimations, standard errors in parentheses; standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country of origin and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significance at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 2.2. Determinants of Various Types of Participation

Dep. Var:	(1) TU Member	(2) Party Member	(3) Work for Party	(4) Work for an Association	(5) Signing Petitions	(6) Demonst-rations	(7) Boycotting Products
Age	0.031***	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.000***	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HH members	0.009	-0.003	-0.000	0.004	0.001	0.005	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	0.001	0.001	0.002***	0.011***	0.016***	0.005***	0.015***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Female	-0.073***	-0.010	0.002	0.009	0.031	-0.017	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Married	-0.005	-0.001	-0.011	-0.022	-0.033	-0.028	-0.073***
	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Divorced	0.035	0.005	0.007	-0.013	0.049	0.014	0.010
	(0.033)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Income	0.009	0.002***	0.005***	0.012***	0.017***	0.006**	0.016***
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Employee	0.181***	-0.010	-0.010	-0.005	-0.011	0.020	-0.011
	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Unemployed	-0.093***	-0.018***	0.003	-0.005	-0.062**	-0.012	-0.039
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.024)
Home TU membership	0.334* (0.190)						
Home Party membership		-0.065 (0.063)					
Home Working for a Party			-0.201* (0.111)				
Home Working for organizations				-0.083 (0.073)			
Home Signing Petitions					0.234*** (0.046)		
Home Demonstrating						0.036 (0.043)	
Home Boycotting Products							0.613*** (0.175)
Wald(df) chi2	(11)234.49	(11) 45.99	(11) 53.20	(11) 103.75	(11)200.07	(11)45.83	(11)417.44
PseudoR	0.087	0.049	0.037	0.058	0.077	0.025	0.085
Observations	2961	2707	2737	2734	2930	2933	2928

Table 3. Immigrants versus Natives. Culture Transmission or Assimilation?

Dep. Var: Civic Participation	(1) Natives		(2) Immigrants		(3) Immigrants: Assimilation Characteristics	
Individual characteristics						
Number of hh members	-0.010**	(0.005)	0.012	(0.010)	0.008	(0.010)
Age	0.019***	(0.002)	0.016***	(0.006)	0.015**	(0.008)
Age squared	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Years of schooling	0.022***	(0.002)	0.017***	(0.003)	0.019***	(0.003)
Female	-0.044***	(0.015)	-0.039*	(0.021)	-0.034	(0.023)
Married	0.016**	(0.008)	-0.048	(0.031)	-0.040	(0.034)
Divorced/separated	0.034***	(0.012)	-0.042	(0.041)	-0.054	(0.038)
Income	0.025***	(0.006)	0.013**	(0.005)	0.010**	(0.005)
Employee	0.075***	(0.017)	0.078**	(0.031)	0.085***	(0.031)
Unemployed	-0.060***	(0.023)	-0.119***	(0.040)	-0.108***	(0.039)
Protestant	0.018	(0.012)	0.071*	(0.037)	0.074*	(0.041)
Catholic	-0.055**	(0.025)	-0.036*	(0.020)	-0.038*	(0.022)
Eastern Orthodox	0.051*	(0.028)	-0.024	(0.034)	-0.004	(0.033)
Muslim	0.044	(0.043)	-0.032	(0.035)	-0.024	(0.044)
Jew	-0.005	(0.091)	0.019	(0.179)	-0.005	(0.177)
Other Christian	0.031	(0.028)	-0.045	(0.047)	-0.026	(0.044)
Skilled worker	0.031	(0.022)	0.047	(0.088)	0.075	(0.094)
Unskilled worker	0.033	(0.029)	0.025	(0.101)	0.047	(0.107)
Manufacturing/construction	-0.074***	(0.020)	-0.066	(0.090)	-0.078	(0.095)
Agriculture	-0.088***	(0.026)	-0.194***	(0.072)	-0.173**	(0.075)
Trade/services	-0.065***	(0.010)	-0.062*	(0.033)	-0.066**	(0.033)
Carer	-0.034	(0.021)	-0.009	(0.038)	-0.009	(0.036)
Area characteristics						
Mean area income	-0.002	(0.013)	-0.004	(0.040)	-0.004	(0.039)
Living in urban area	0.004	(0.012)	0.027*	(0.014)	0.035**	(0.014)
Immigrant characteristics						
Years since migration: < 2					0.166	(0.203)
Years since migration: 2-5					0.246	(0.168)
Years since migration: 6-10					0.254*	(0.135)
Years since migration: 11-20					0.188*	(0.105)
Immigration year					-0.022**	(0.009)
Age at migration: <15					-0.231	(0.164)
Age at migration: 15-25					-0.165	(0.130)
Age at migration: 26-35					-0.132	(0.113)
Age at migration: 36-45					-0.096	(0.087)
Language ability					0.040*	(0.024)
Citizen					0.064***	(0.022)
Home civic participation rate					0.082	(0.063)
Host civic participation rate					0.883***	(0.338)
Wald(df) chi2 / PseudoR	(24) 8618.12 / 0.152		(24) 367.88 / 0.091		(37) 3935.45/ 0.144	
Observations	48559		2961		2939	

Marginal effects of probit estimations are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country of birth (for immigrants). Significance at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 4. Robustness

	(1) Non-Industrialized		(2) Poisson		(3) PS Matching	
Individual characteristics						
Number of hh members	-0.005	(0.012)	0.002	(0.023)	0.012	(0.011)
Age	0.014	(0.012)	0.044**	(0.018)	0.013*	(0.007)
Age squared	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Years of schooling	0.023***	(0.005)	0.047***	(0.005)	0.017***	(0.003)
Female	-0.046	(0.030)	-0.046	(0.060)	-0.031	(0.023)
Married	-0.043	(0.048)	-0.068	(0.077)	-0.052*	(0.032)
Divorced/separated	-0.081**	(0.041)	0.055	(0.086)	-0.048	(0.039)
Income	0.015**	(0.007)	0.039***	(0.012)	0.008	(0.005)
Employee	0.074	(0.057)	0.178***	(0.064)	0.076***	(0.029)
Unemployed	-0.120***	(0.046)	-0.282**	(0.121)	-0.106***	(0.037)
Protestant	0.017	(0.073)	-0.022	(0.063)	0.061*	(0.037)
Catholic	-0.022	(0.033)	-0.149***	(0.043)	-0.047**	(0.022)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.006	(0.054)	0.008	(0.096)	-0.092*	(0.048)
Muslim	0.000	(0.058)	-0.041	(0.110)	-0.056	(0.048)
Jew	0.329	(0.223)	-0.297	(0.237)	0.042	(0.186)
Other Christian	-0.095	(0.076)	0.032	(0.084)	-0.023	(0.049)
Skilled worker	0.156	(0.125)	-0.091	(0.223)	0.105	(0.094)
Unskilled worker	0.137	(0.146)	-0.117	(0.236)	0.090	(0.108)
Manufacturing/construction	-0.131	(0.131)	0.008	(0.229)	-0.108	(0.097)
Agriculture	-0.256***	(0.059)	-0.452*	(0.261)	-0.189***	(0.071)
Trade/services	-0.046	(0.044)	-0.080	(0.072)	-0.064**	(0.030)
Carer	-0.034	(0.062)	0.000	(0.111)	-0.020	(0.033)
Area characteristics						
Living in urban area	0.040	(0.028)	0.063	(0.045)	0.032*	(0.017)
Mean area income	-0.035	(0.022)	-0.155	(0.094)	-0.016	(0.017)
Immigrant characteristics						
Years since migration: < 2	0.548*	(0.398)	0.008	(0.392)	0.175	(0.196)
Years since migration: 2-5	0.603***	(0.116)	0.615**	(0.295)	0.246	(0.161)
Years since migration: 6-10	0.525***	(0.117)	0.524**	(0.257)	0.242*	(0.132)
Years since migration: 11-20	0.384***	(0.119)	0.504***	(0.184)	0.183*	(0.100)
Immigration year	-0.042***	(0.007)	-0.038**	(0.016)	-0.023**	(0.009)
Age at migration: <15	-0.418***	(0.128)	0.010	(0.376)	-0.272	(0.171)
Age at migration: 15-25	-0.256	(0.291)	-0.096	(0.266)	-0.204	(0.130)
Age at migration: 26-35	-0.227	(0.201)	-0.070	(0.215)	-0.182	(0.111)
Age at migration: 36-45	-0.081	(0.090)	0.070	(0.173)	-0.128	(0.088)
Language ability	0.067	(0.049)	0.205***	(0.071)	0.012	(0.030)
Citizen	0.106***	(0.031)	0.112**	(0.054)	0.064***	(0.021)
Home country participation	0.002	(0.104)	0.158	(0.154)	0.102	(0.074)
Host country participation	0.963***	(0.173)	3.546***	(1.138)	0.826***	(0.117)
Constant			72.087**	(0.385)		
Pseudo R-sq	0.180				0.139	
Wald, Pearson	chi2(37)=	0.000	chi2(2886)=	0.000	chi2(37)	0.000
/Prob > chi2	285.93		3883.003		=4231.14	
Observations	1302		2939		2933	

Marginal effects of probit estimations are reported in column 1 and 3. Coefficients in column 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the country of birth, column 1-2. Bootstrapped standard errors in column 3, number of replications: 1000. Significance at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 5-1. Home Country Effects

Panel A. First Stage Regression

	Coefficients	*St.Errors*		*Coefficients*	*St.Errors*
AL	-1.146	(0.787)	HU	-0.772	(0.790)
AM	-0.270	(0.873)	IE	-0.818	(0.795)
AR	-0.979	(0.844)	IN	-1.375*	(0.798)
AT	-0.992	(0.783)	IS	-1.227	(0.931)
AU	-1.061	(0.888)	IT	-0.935	(0.764)
BA	-1.036	(0.771)	JP	-1.287	(0.909)
BD	-1.452	(0.913)	LV	-0.808	(0.938)
BE	-0.827	(0.771)	MA	-0.914	(0.772)
BG	-1.288	(0.849)	NL	-0.868	(0.774)
BR	-0.776	(0.811)	NO	-1.212	(0.816)
CA	-0.942	(0.842)	NZ	-0.380	(1.033)
CH	-0.319	(0.854)	PE	-0.882	(0.846)
CL	-0.800	(0.810)	PH	-1.245	(0.801)
CN	-1.902**	(0.851)	PL	-1.249	(0.767)
CO	-1.308	(0.835)	PT	-0.685	(0.765)
CS	-0.661	(0.788)	RO	-1.135	(0.776)
CZ	-0.800	(0.799)	RU	-1.424*	(0.771)
DE	-0.800	(0.759)	SE	-1.024	(0.796)
DK	-0.863	(0.792)	SI	-0.368	(0.909)
EE	-1.366	(0.847)	SK	-1.035	(0.800)
ES	-0.647	(0.778)	TR	-1.008	(0.764)
FI	-0.467	(0.787)	UA	-1.380*	(0.826)
FR	-0.727	(0.764)	UG	-1.199	(0.887)
GB	-0.749	(0.764)	US	-1.151	(0.791)
GE	-0.771	(0.814)	VN	-1.579**	(0.796)
GR	-0.902	(0.817)	ZA	-0.818	(0.831)
HR	-1.213	(0.779)	Const:	-1.273*	(0.750)
Observations	2956		Pseudo R2	0.122	

Omitted group: Latvia. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Panel B. Second Stage Regression

	(1)		(2)	
Home participation rate	0.705***	(0.217)	-0.503	(0.429)
Empowerment rights index			0.044	(0.030)
GDP per capita			0.000	(0.000)
School enrolment rates			-0.001	(0.002)
1 if industrialized			0.374*	(0.224)
Religious fragmentation			-0.397*	(0.208)
Migration rate			0.033*	(0.018)
Constant	-0.926***	(0.134)	-1.075***	(0.301)
Observations	54		54	
R-squared	0.14		0.70	

Bootstrapped standard errors, number of replications 1000

Table 5-2. Destination Country Effects

Panel A. First Stage Regression

	Coefficients	*St.Errors*		*Coefficients*	*St.Errors*
AT	0.804**	(0.395)	GR	-0.319	(0.397)
BE	0.915**	(0.396)	HU	-0.195	(0.455)
CH	0.711*	(0.390)	IE	0.795**	(0.399)
DE	0.439	(0.390)	LU	0.869**	(0.389)
CZ	0.275	(0.410)	NL	0.572	(0.398)
DK	1.219***	(0.420)	NO	1.320***	(0.406)
ES	0.467	(0.412)	PT	-0.043	(0.476)
FI	1.162***	(0.430)	SE	1.521***	(0.394)
FR	1.010**	(0.403)	SI	0.339	(0.417)
GB	0.559	(0.400)	Constant	-2.643***	(0.472)
Observations	2956		Pseudo R2	0.13	

Omitted group: Poland (has the smallest number of immigrants).

Panel B. Second Stage Regression

	(1)		(2)	
Host participation rate	2.267***	(0.183)	2.258***	(0.415)
Empowerment rights index			0.008	(0.044)
GDP per capita			-0.000	(0.000)
Religious fragmentation			-0.086	(0.390)
Migration rate			0.003	(0.028)
Constant	-0.613***	(0.120)	-0.630	(0.503)
Observations	19		19	
R-squared	0.86		0.87	

Bootstrapped standard errors, number of replications 1000

Table A1. Variables' Definition and Data Sources

TU member: equals 1 if an individual is an active member of a trade union, 0 otherwise.
PARTY member: equals 1 if an individual is an active member of a political party, 0 otherwise.
Work for Party, Work for an Association, Signing Petitions, Demonstrations, Boycotting Products: equals 1 if an individual undertook one of these activities in the past 12 month
Civic Participation: equals one if a least one of the previous variables equals one.
Age: age of individuals, from 15 to 70
Age squared
Gender: dummy equal to 1 if male, 2 if female
Education: years of completed schooling
Income: levels of income on a scale from 1 to 12
Married: dummy equal to 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Divorced: dummy equal to 1 if divorced or separated, 0 otherwise
Employee: dummy equal to 1 if employed, 0 if self-employed, working in family business
Unemployed: dummy equal to 1 if actively or inactively unemployed in the last 7 days
Skilled worker: dummy equal to 1 if an individual reports working in occupations coded 6000-8000, ISO standard
Unskilled worker: dummy equal to 1 if an individual reports working in occupations coded 9000-es, ISO standard
Protestant: dummy equal to 1 if Protestant, 0 otherwise
Catholic: dummy equal to 1 if Catholic, 0 otherwise
Jewish: dummy equal to 1 if Jewish, 0 otherwise
Muslim: dummy equal to 1 if Muslim, 0 otherwise
Other Christian: dummy equal to 1 if belongs to other religion (excluded: other religions)
Years since migration: >2: for immigrants, length of stay in a country: less than two years
Years since migration: 2-5: 2 to 5 years
Years since migration: 6-10: 6 to 10 years
Years since migration: 11-20: 11 to 20 years (omitted category: over 20 years)
Immigr_year: arrival year, cohort effects
Language proficiency: dummy equal to 1 if an individual speaks any official language of a country of residence at home (two mentioned languages are reported)
Citizen: dummy equal to 1 if an immigrant has a citizenship of the country of residence
Parent_born_cntr: dummy equal to one if one of the parents is born in the country of residence
Age at migration: a set of dummies indicating the age of an individual at the time of migration

Urban: dummy equal to 1 if an individual lives in a big city or on the outskirts of a big city
Mean income area: average level of income by area of residence

Host Participation Rate: average level of civic participation, by host country, calculated separately for immigrants and natives. Source: ESS.
Home Participation Rate: average level of civic participation in the source country; for immigrants. Source: WVS.

GDP: GDP per capita values, 2003. World Bank Development Indicators. 2006
Enrolment: Secondary school enrollment, (% gross). World Bank Development Indicators. 2006.
Migration rate: net migration rates per 1000 of population, average 2000-2005. Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.
Religious Fragmentation: index constructed using the following formula:

$$\text{Religion}_i = 1 - \sum_k s_{ki}^2,$$

where s is a share of k major religion denominations in country i (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000)
Source of the information on percentages of religious denominations: CIA World Factbook. 2006.
Empowerment Rights Index: an aggregate index of freedom of movement, freedom of speech, degree of protection of workers' rights, political participation, and freedom of religion indicators. Range: 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). Source: Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database. www.ciri. binghamton.edu. Details of construction are in David, Gelleny, and Sacko, 2001.

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean		Std.Dev.		Obs	
	Immigrants	Natives	Immigrants	Natives	Immigrants	Natives
Dependent Variable						
CIVIC_PARTIC	0.489	0.547	0.500	0.498	3878	62234
Individual characteristics						
Number of hh members	2.969	2.935	1.482	1.429	3876	62215
Age	42.44	42.722	13.96	15.279	3837	62234
Age squared	1996.2	2058.609	1226.922	1319.837	3837	62234
Gender (1-m, 2-f)	1.537	1.521	0.498	0.499	3878	62202
Years of schooling	12.178	12.122	4.271	3.756	3813	61622
Income	6.849	6.335	2.457	2.523	2996	48910
Married	0.595	0.528	0.4908	0.499	3878	62234
Divorced	0.113	0.086	0.317	0.281	3878	62234
Employee	0.775	0.742	0.418	0.437	3878	62234
Unemployed	0.074	0.061	0.261	0.241	3878	62234
Protestant	0.074	0.144	0.262	0.351	3878	62234
Catholic	0.3061	0.329	0.461	0.470	3878	62234
Jewish	0.004	0.001	0.060	0.022	3878	62234
Muslim	0.087	0.004	0.282	0.064	3878	62234
Eastern Orthodox	0.073	0. 055	0.261	0.227	3878	62233
Other religion	0.405	0.449	0.491	0.497	3878	62233
Skilled worker	0.209	0.216	0.406	0.411	3878	62233
Unskilled worker	0.254	0.216	0.435	0.412	3878	62233
Manufacturing/construction	0.460	0.409	0.498	0.491	3878	62233
Agriculture	0.021	0.041	0.143	0.199	3878	62233
Trade/services	0.127	0.134	0.333	0.340	3878	62233
Carer	0.072	0.027	0 .258	0.161	3878	62233
Total hours worked	39.451	40.054	15.137	14.867	3288	52257
Additional Immigrants' Characteristics						
Length of stay	3.954	-	1.136	-	3854	-
Cohort: arrival time	1982.27	-	14.27	-	3850	-
Age at migration	15.34	-	15.53	-	3878	
Parent born in host country	0.108	-	0.310	-	3878	-
Citizen	0.418	-	0.493	-	3871	-
Language proficiency	0.845	-	0.362	-	3878	-
Area Characteristics						
Urban	0.450	0.308	0.492	0.462	3878	62234
Mean income area	7.149	6.424	1.297	1.394	3878	62234
Institutional and Cultural Proxies						
Home country civic participation	0.499	0.547	0.205	0.498	3878	62234
GDP per capita	6516.89	27638.83	8543.63	13169.23	3850	62233
Secondary school enrolment	101.185	-	25.31	-	3878	-
Net migration rate	1.159	2.943	3.148	2.816	3878	62233
Religious fragmentation	0.352	0.367	0.232	0.221	3819	62233
Empowerment right index	7.830	8.779	2.547	1.633	3761	62233

Table A3. Percentage of Various Types of Activities, Immigrants and Natives

		TU member	Party member	Work for party	Work for other orgntn	Signing Petitions	Public Demonstration	Boycott Products
% of individuals involved in this activity	im	19.07	3.40	3.72	10.66	21.45	9.17	16.55
	nat	23.73	4.98	4.89	15.19	24.72	8.14	16.61
out of those involved in this activity, % for whom this is the only type of civic involvement	im	51.34	17.45	8.05	19.48	30.17	17.02	29.18
	nat	43.62	17.49	7.82	19.47	27.12	17.13	22.13

Table A4. Overlap of Various Types of Activities, Immigrants

	TU member, %	Party member, %	Work for party, %	Work for other orgntn, %	Signing Petitions, %	Public Demonstration, %	Boycotting Products, %
TU member	–	6.63	7.05	17.47	28.91	14.99	22.58
Party member	37.58	–	42.57	36.49	43.62	30.20	27.03
Work for party	36.21	39.13	–	56.65	60.69	47.13	41.86
Work for other orgntn	31.33	11.14	19.68	–	52.73	27.97	37.65
Signing Petitions	25.67	7.12	10.50	26.10	_	26.00	40.32
Public Demonstration	31.24	11.08	19.16	32.48	60.89	–	40.61
Boycotting Products	26.07	5.79	9.35	24.16	52.21	22.47	–

Comment: The table reads horizontally. For example, of all party members, 37.58% are also trade union members, and 27.03% are boycotting certain products. However, of all those who are boycotting products, only 5.79% are party members.

Table A5. Number of Civic Involvements, Immigrants

Number of involvements per person	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
0	2,011	51.86	51.86
1	1,013	26.12	77.98
2	441	11.37	89.35
3	247	6.37	95.72
4	114	2.94	98.66
5	31	0.80	99.46
6	16	0.41	99.87
7	5	0.13	100.00
Total	3,878	100.00	

Table A6. Destination Country Summary Statistics

Country	Obs Total	Obs by Group		TU Memb. Rates		Party Memb. Rates		Work for Party Rates		Work for Org Rates		Signing Petition Rates		Demonstration Rates		Boycotting Rates		Civic Particip. Rates	
		Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm	Nat	Imm
Austria	4511	3709	268	0.217	0.133	0.116	0.035	0.103	0.034	0.204	0.129	0.275	0.244	0.091	0.118	0.221	0.231	0.608	0.506
Belgium	3671	2929	203	0.341	0.239	0.065	0.050	0.047	0.069	0.208	0.148	0.302	0.276	0.077	0.108	0.116	0.173	0.653	0.559
Switzerland	4169	2972	565	0.150	0.092	0.080	0.021	0.084	0.035	0.177	0.090	0.440	0.304	0.087	0.094	0.326	0.250	0.656	0.511
Czech Rep.	4386	3504	98	0.094	0.109	0.033	0.042	0.035	0.061	0.098	0.115	0.144	0.156	0.038	0.082	0.086	0.096	0.340	0.336
Germany	5785	4685	321	0.140	0.090	0.032	0.008	0.040	0.009	0.213	0.081	0.349	0.171	0.117	0.072	0.249	0.134	0.607	0.351
Denmark	2990	2512	76	0.710	0.491	0.062	0.018	0.045	0.067	0.217	0.160	0.305	0.203	0.072	0.080	0.271	0.267	0.867	0.652
Spain	3386	2684	112	0.086	0.034	0.037	0.007	0.074	0.036	0.180	0.144	0.271	0.125	0.286	0.188	0.125	0.107	0.502	0.345
Finland	4022	3446	48	0.537	0.338	0.058	0.029	0.038	0.021	0.308	0.146	0.266	0.188	0.020	0.083	0.298	0.292	0.797	0.603
France	3291	2611	124	0.074	0.084	0.017	0.037	0.044	0.089	0.175	0.202	0.357	0.331	0.160	0.138	0.299	0.333	0.563	0.550
Great Britain	3931	2993	154	0.187	0.104	0.017	0.022	0.026	0.045	0.089	0.110	0.409	0.327	0.044	0.078	0.245	0.240	0.593	0.444
Greece	4968	3619	287	0.112	0.072	0.063	0.029	0.065	0.007	0.065	0.018	0.047	0.014	0.056	0.007	0.080	0.021	0.282	0.126
Hungary	3183	2757	39	0.103	0.065	0.011	0.022	0.019	0.026	0.024	0.000	0.051	0.051	0.028	0.000	0.049	0.053	0.205	0.152
Ireland	4329	3573	153	0.213	0.186	0.049	0.025	0.047	0.054	0.135	0.155	0.256	0.324	0.063	0.107	0.121	0.250	0.495	0.553
Luxembourg	3184	1964	778	0.317	0.228	0.111	0.011	0.054	0.018	0.258	0.110	0.282	0.191	0.214	0.111	0.162	0.131	0.679	0.484
Netherlands	4235	3429	147	0.230	0.171	0.050	0.029	0.036	0.048	0.213	0.116	0.241	0.286	0.036	0.082	0.105	0.153	0.533	0.463
Norway	3796	3162	133	0.506	0.385	0.082	0.036	0.092	0.158	0.268	0.286	0.400	0.398	0.097	0.203	0.230	0.316	0.797	0.733
Poland	3826	3436	15	0.084	0.105	0.014	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.088	0.067	0.016	0.000	0.049	0.000	0.228	0.211
Portugal	3554	2786	43	0.096	0.081	0.035	0.010	0.029	0.000	0.041	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.041	0.023	0.027	0.047	0.207	0.152
Sweden	3937	3093	244	0.638	0.591	0.069	0.053	0.043	0.025	0.263	0.160	0.482	0.434	0.066	0.094	0.365	0.311	0.879	0.807
Slovenia	2960	2370	70	0.231	0.326	0.038	0.021	0.035	0.029	0.017	0.029	0.098	0.074	0.023	0.029	0.038	0.059	0.358	0.368
Total	78114	62234	3878	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average	3906	3112	194	0.253	0.196	0.052	0.025	0.049	0.042	0.161	0.110	0.256	0.208	0.082	0.085	0.173	0.173	0.542	0.445
Std.Dev	697.76	595.42	187.93	0.196	0.155	0.030	0.014	0.023	0.036	0.089	0.074	0.134	0.127	0.069	0.055	0.107	0.107	0.215	0.191
Max	5785	4685	778	0.710	0.591	0.116	0.053	0.103	0.158	0.308	0.286	0.482	0.434	0.286	0.203	0.365	0.333	0.879	0.807
Min	2960	1964	15	0.074	0.034	0.011	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.047	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.205	0.126

Table A7. Source Country Summary Statistics (ESS rounds pooled and WVS)

Country	Obs		TU Memb. Rates		Party Memb. Rates		Work for Party Rates		Work for Org Rates		Signing Petition Rates		Demonstration Rates		Boycotting Rates		Civic Particip. Rates	
	ESS	WVS	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home
AL	166	1000	0.082	0.094	0.028	0.145	0.011	0.114	0.028	0.405	0.036	0.152	0.017	0.193	0.037	0.037	0.161	0.404
AM	12	2000	0.089	0.013	0.029	0.012	0.018	N/a	0.042	N/a	0.067	0.173	0.026	0.275	0.058	0.116	0.204	0.372
AR	19	1280	0.054	0.025	0.014	0.045	0.041	0.030	0.136	0.159	0.194	0.215	0.158	0.128	0.169	0.018	0.410	0.295
AT	57	1522	0.144	0.189	0.021	0.118	0.034	0.034	0.099	0.201	0.275	0.552	0.094	0.157	0.219	0.093	0.498	0.653
AU	13	2048	0.117	0.119	0.024	0.026	0.037	N/a	0.101	N/a	0.262	0.786	0.075	0.180	0.198	0.213	0.412	0.813
BA	140	1200	0.302	0.068	0.029	0.071	0.041	0.031	0.112	0.101	0.238	0.207	0.088	0.086	0.194	0.063	0.535	0.323
BD	9	1499	0.168	0.148	0.025	0.235	0.044	0.229	0.130	0.577	0.316	0.130	0.098	0.063	0.236	0.053	0.498	0.382
BE	124	1912	0.209	0.158	0.015	0.070	0.027	0.029	0.115	0.253	0.211	0.709	0.109	0.389	0.150	0.115	0.483	0.775
BG	26	1000	0.103	0.071	0.026	0.047	0.016	0.037	0.046	0.097	0.090	0.102	0.036	0.148	0.088	0.033	0.248	0.265
BR	51	1149	0.115	0.097	0.018	0.072	0.020	N/a	0.058	N/a	0.130	0.466	0.062	0.247	0.126	0.062	0.318	0.584
CA	20	1931	0.168	0.134	0.024	0.061	0.047	0.027	0.125	0.372	0.276	0.734	0.094	0.192	0.223	0.185	0.494	0.770
CH	22	1212	0.174	0.059	0.021	0.067	0.033	N/a	0.121	N/a	0.224	0.662	0.103	0.164	0.188	0.106	0.472	0.693
CL	25	1200	0.345	0.031	0.036	0.025	0.075	0.019	0.189	0.301	0.359	0.183	0.141	0.149	0.281	0.047	0.666	0.275
CN	23	1000	0.166	0.069	0.022	0.083	0.036	0.099	0.119	0.495	0.242	N/a	0.105	N/a	0.186	N/a	0.470	0.191
CO	22	6025	0.113	0.038	0.015	0.060	0.034	N/a	0.134	N/a	0.189	0.181	0.154	0.110	0.151	0.072	0.426	0.280
CS	59	1908	0.163	0.136	0.025	0.058	0.029	0.013	0.103	0.035	0.246	0.273	0.088	0.226	0.210	0.178	0.477	0.421
CZ	33	2036	0.138	0.102	0.022	0.041	0.027	0.024	0.102	0.183	0.214	0.561	0.087	0.260	0.173	0.082	0.426	0.647
DE	351	1023	0.173	0.070	0.025	0.029	0.036	0.011	0.113	0.114	0.264	0.519	0.099	0.320	0.211	0.076	0.508	0.587
DK	47	1005	0.369	0.543	0.033	0.066	0.083	0.026	0.197	0.212	0.335	0.552	0.143	0.284	0.264	0.239	0.661	0.815
EE	17	2409	0.354	0.047	0.032	0.017	0.023	0.015	0.145	0.134	0.225	0.189	0.084	0.101	0.291	0.028	0.618	0.293
ES	66	1038	0.140	0.037	0.024	0.017	0.045	0.012	0.122	0.107	0.268	0.240	0.098	0.241	0.223	0.049	0.484	0.359
FI	92	1615	0.539	0.336	0.049	0.061	0.031	0.026	0.158	0.217	0.416	0.480	0.097	0.139	0.304	0.143	0.772	0.652
FR	242	1000	0.197	0.041	0.021	0.019	0.034	0.007	0.117	0.162	0.235	0.671	0.108	0.383	0.171	0.119	0.501	0.716
GB	197	2008	0.199	0.073	0.026	0.026	0.054	0.013	0.148	0.247	0.297	0.791	0.111	0.128	0.228	0.159	0.536	0.807
GE	38	1142	0.120	0.007	0.026	0.020	0.014	N/a	0.043	N/a	0.062	0.135	0.029	0.189	0.058	0.056	0.221	0.270
GR	22	1003	0.200	0.083	0.025	0.079	0.036	0.052	0.120	0.323	0.271	0.484	0.093	0.461	0.201	0.043	0.501	0.670
HR	81	1000	0.204	0.118	0.025	0.050	0.037	0.020	0.091	0.145	0.218	0.364	0.082	0.074	0.184	0.075	0.475	0.474
HU	41	1012	0.217	0.071	0.035	0.017	0.042	0.009	0.128	0.115	0.266	0.152	0.101	0.047	0.213	0.027	0.526	0.227
IE	40	2002	0.124	0.101	0.023	0.043	0.042	0.020	0.110	0.206	0.315	0.594	0.082	0.212	0.232	0.081	0.458	0.652
IN	46	968	0.151	0.081	0.027	0.114	0.044	0.082	0.114	0.276	0.286	0.238	0.084	0.188	0.212	0.105	0.459	0.375

Country	Obs		TU Memb. Rates		Party Memb. Rates		Work for Party Rates		Work for Org Rates		Signing Petition Rates		Demonstration Rates		Boycotting Rates		Civic Particip. Rates	
	ESS	WVS	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home	Imm	Home
IS	8	2000	0.453	0.597	0.036	0.190	0.071	0.034	0.185	0.158	0.354	0.525	0.116	0.205	0.292	0.176	0.704	0.865
IT	252	1362	0.162	0.062	0.024	0.041	0.037	0.023	0.113	0.168	0.251	0.524	0.103	0.330	0.193	0.097	0.498	0.624
JP	7	1018	0.188	0.065	0.026	0.035	0.033	0.012	0.125	0.094	0.267	0.568	0.114	0.096	0.215	0.066	0.515	0.606
LT	5	1013	0.245	0.022	0.027	0.020	0.035	0.019	0.109	0.103	0.279	0.253	0.073	0.118	0.173	0.040	0.499	0.330
LV	6	2264	0.323	0.113	0.022	0.019	0.038	0.009	0.133	0.144	0.251	0.177	0.084	0.237	0.227	0.037	0.561	0.410
MA	101	1535	0.131	0.005	0.029	0.007	0.059	N/a	0.153	N/a	0.251	0.134	0.131	0.105	0.200	0.061	0.481	0.211
NL	95	1003	0.213	0.236	0.028	0.093	0.041	0.026	0.123	0.331	0.249	0.613	0.105	0.323	0.179	0.218	0.517	0.751
NO	23	1127	0.465	0.155	0.037	0.032	0.030	N/a	0.141	N/a	0.326	0.645	0.089	0.261	0.265	0.179	0.682	0.721
NZ	5	1201	0.201	0.055	0.029	0.018	0.041	N/a	0.120	N/a	0.348	0.881	0.081	0.186	0.255	0.162	0.517	0.886
PE	15	1501	0.213	0.045	0.023	0.047	0.042	0.033	0.134	0.343	0.244	0.210	0.123	0.161	0.195	0.072	0.511	0.358
PH	32	1200	0.215	0.039	0.024	0.043	0.053	0.038	0.138	0.458	0.272	0.104	0.108	0.068	0.214	0.051	0.526	0.208
PL	148	1095	0.186	0.100	0.023	0.009	0.030	0.006	0.112	0.092	0.232	0.209	0.089	0.088	0.181	0.043	0.462	0.306
PT	359	1000	0.202	0.024	0.015	0.016	0.026	0.010	0.116	0.101	0.216	0.260	0.111	0.164	0.162	0.055	0.493	0.326
RO	95	1146	0.119	0.092	0.024	0.023	0.032	0.018	0.087	0.079	0.167	0.090	0.079	0.134	0.142	0.015	0.365	0.234
RU	118	2500	0.152	0.231	0.016	0.007	0.024	0.003	0.099	0.028	0.183	0.109	0.081	0.230	0.157	0.023	0.403	0.435
SE	36	1015	0.315	0.624	0.030	0.103	0.087	0.043	0.191	0.425	0.299	0.871	0.132	0.353	0.274	0.334	0.623	0.945
SI	14	1006	0.112	0.169	0.026	0.030	0.034	0.013	0.105	0.201	0.272	0.307	0.100	0.092	0.228	0.077	0.494	0.464
SK	91	1331	0.108	0.162	0.038	0.069	0.055	0.051	0.109	0.318	0.165	0.574	0.083	0.132	0.110	0.035	0.349	0.644
TR	220	4607	0.178	0.005	0.026	0.009	0.033	0.008	0.110	0.008	0.232	0.150	0.085	0.074	0.181	0.062	0.460	0.186
UA	32	1195	0.098	0.210	0.017	0.021	0.016	0.012	0.054	0.072	0.105	0.125	0.052	0.167	0.090	0.044	0.274	0.385
UG	11	1002	0.174	0.077	0.027	0.095	0.035	0.061	0.094	0.604	0.240	0.161	0.060	0.121	0.189	0.103	0.409	0.344
US	45	1200	0.181	0.127	0.026	0.187	0.055	0.066	0.132	0.578	0.258	0.809	0.101	0.204	0.211	0.244	0.485	0.852
VN	38	995	0.237	0.114	0.031	0.286	0.063	0.239	0.154	0.547	0.312	0.052	0.116	0.018	0.257	0.005	0.579	0.361
ZA	21	3000	0.188	0.063	0.022	0.092	0.046	0.043	0.120	0.431	0.269	0.249	0.087	0.128	0.217	0.129	0.485	0.407
Total	3878	83463																
Average	72	1546	0.198	0.121	0.026	0.061	0.039	0.039	0.117	0.238	0.242	0.379	0.094	0.184	0.194	0.094	0.478	0.499
Std.Dev	83.54	899.32	0.099	0.132	0.006	0.058	0.016	0.049	0.035	0.161	0.075	0.245	0.029	0.095	0.059	0.069	0.118	0.205
Max	359	6025	0.539	0.624	0.049	0.286	0.087	0.239	0.197	0.604	0.416	0.881	0.158	0.461	0.304	0.334	0.772	0.945
Min	5	968	0.054	0.005	0.014	0.007	0.011	0.003	0.028	0.008	0.036	0.052	0.017	0.018	0.037	0.005	0.161	0.186

Table A8. Example of the Propensity Score Estimation. Albanians

Treatment (immigration)	Frequency	Percent
0 (natives in Albania, WVS)	1000	14.327
1 (Albanian emigrants, ESS)	166	85.763

Probit estimates

Dep. Variable: Immigrant	Coeff	Std. Error	P>|z|
Younger than 25	0.631	0.153	0.000
Older than 45	0.802	0.129	0.000
Secondary education	1.529	0.188	0.000
Female	-0.366	0.101	0.000
Constant	-2.369	0.250	0.000
N. obs	1166		
LR chi2(4)	157.98		
Pseudo R2	0.166		

Description of the estimated propensity score

Percentiles	Smallest	Largest		
1%	0.0009641	.0009641		
5%	0.0031182	.0009641		
10%	0.0067583	.0009641	Obs	1166
25%	0.026621	.0009641	Sum of Wgt.	1166
50%	0.1140345	Mean	.1423853	
		Std. Dev.	.1219163	
75%	0.2208893	.3433954		
90%	0.3433954	.3433954	Variance	.0148636
95%	0.3433954	.3433954	Skewness	.4084666
99%	0.3433954	.3433954	Kurtosis	1.726445

The final number of blocks is 4

Calculated average participation rate, by blocks:

Block number	Participation rates		
	Mean	Frequency	Percent
1	0.2965	56	33.73
2	0.4333	34	20.48
3	0.4752	12	7.23
4	0.5776	64	38.55

Each Albanian emigrant is assigned one of these four participation rates, which serve her as a reference participating average. The assignment is based on the propensity score. For example, if emigrant's characteristics produce a propensity score that falls within the first interval, the relevant reference participation rate is the average participation of those non-emigrants, whose characteristics produce propensity scores which fall within the same interval. To compare, average civic participation rate of all non-emigrant Albanians is 0.444. This value was used uniformly for all Albanian emigrants in estimations described in Tables 1-6. Also note that the number of blocks and, hence, of reference groups, differs by country of origin. The maximum number is 5, for Bosnians.

**Figure A1.** Civic Participation: Natives and Immigrants

Figure A2. Country Dummies and Country Effects