A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Heller, Yuval (2005): A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a universal cheap-talk protocol (a polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels) that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: non-cooperative games; cheap-talk; correlated equilibrium; strong equilibrium; coalition-proof equilibrium; fault-tolerant distributed computation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games