Claude, Denis and Tidball, Mabel (2006): Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization.
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This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms' production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm's ownership status.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization|
|Keywords:||Mixed Oligopoly; Pollution Control; Markovian Taxation|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy
L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
|Depositing User:||Denis Claude|
|Date Deposited:||11. Nov 2006|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 08:47|