Goldthau, Andreas (2008): Divided over Iraq, United over Iran. A Rational Choice Explanation to European Irrationalities. Published in: European Political Economy Review , Vol. Spring, No. 8 (2008): pp. 40-67.
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The War on Iraq in has split the continent into ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’. On Iran, by contrast, the EU jointly acts in the context of a coordinated European foreign policy. The paper argues that both conflicts resemble an assurance game among the Europeans, in which the entailed trust dilemma prevented involved players from cooperating. It identifies the European ‘Dialogues’ with Iran as a regime that reduced information deficits in the case of Iran. In the case of Iraq, however, European players were unable to mutually judge whether there was a hidden agenda or not – and thus opted for defection instead of cooperation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Divided over Iraq, United over Iran. A Rational Choice Explanation to European Irrationalities|
|Keywords:||European foreign policy, nuclear conflict, WMD, Iran, Iraq, assurance game, regime theory|
|Subjects:||F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F59 - Other
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions
|Depositing User:||Andreas Goldthau|
|Date Deposited:||18. Mar 2008 06:18|
|Last Modified:||27. Mar 2015 03:49|