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Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibrium in Oligopoly

Hirata, Daisuke (2008): Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibrium in Oligopoly.

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Abstract

This paper investigates simultaneous move capacity constrained price competition game among three firms. I find that equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially different from those in the duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. I characterize mixed strategy equilibria and show there exist possibilities of i) the existence of a continuum of equilibria ii) the smallest firm earning the largest profit per capacity and iii) non-identical supports of equilibrium mixed strategies, all of which never arise either in the duopoly or symmetric oligopoly. In particular, the second finding sheds light on a completely new pricing incentive in Bertrand competitions.

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