Eisermann, Michael (2006): Arrovian juntas.
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This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the classification of all such voting systems as dictatorial hierarchies. If we leave the traditional realm of complete orderings, the picture changes. Here we consider the more general setting where alternatives may be incomparable, that is, we allow orderings that are reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete. Instead of a dictator we exhibit a junta whose internal hierarchy or coalition structure can be surprisingly rich. We give an explicit description of all such voting systems, generalizing and unifying various previous results.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Arrovian juntas|
|Keywords:||rank aggregation problem; Arrow's impossibility theorem; classification of arrovian voting systems; partial ordering; partially ordered set; poset; dictator; oligarchy; junta|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations|
|Depositing User:||Michael Eisermann|
|Date Deposited:||03. Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||25. Feb 2013 07:59|