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Bank Incentives, Contract Design, and Bank Runs

Andolfatto, David (2007): Bank Incentives, Contract Design, and Bank Runs. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Theory

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Abstract

We study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig Green-Lin model with a strategic banker.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Subjects:E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
ID Code:8146
Deposited By:David Andolfatto
Deposited On:08. Apr 2008 02:30
Last Modified:08. Apr 2008 02:30
References:

Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory

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