Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making

Lombardelli, Clare and Proudman, James and Talbot, James (2005): Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making. Published in: International Journal of Central Banking , Vol. Volume, No. Number 1 (13. June 2005): pp. 181-205.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_823.pdf

Download (196Kb) | Preview

Abstract

We report the results of an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision making under uncertainty. A large sample of economics students played a simple monetary policy game, both as individuals and in committees of five players. Our findings - that groups make better decisions than individuals - accord with previous work by Blinder and Morgan. We also attempt to establish why this is so. Some of the improvement is related to the ability of committees to strip out the effect of bad play, but there is a significant additional improvement, which we associate with players learning from each other’s interest rate decisions.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.