Consoli, Andrea and Spagano, Salvatore (2008): Law and Institutions: two reasons for Sicilian backwardness?
Download (109kB) | Preview
Many reasons for the low level of local development in Sicily have been advanced through the years, often connected to historical and geographical explanations. More frequently the reasons of the backwardness (better low rate of development) is connected to high level of crime and of mafia phenomenon, or to structural grounds (first of all, Sicily is an island) and intra regional markets’ dimensions. Little space, instead, has been devoted to institutions and law and to the effectiveness of legislative self-government. In ours paper we will slight the constitutional profile trying, instead, to answer, with the typical approach of the economic analysis if is it possible that some reasons of the backwardness of Sicilian economic development are hidden just in this constitutional diversity of Sicily.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Law and Institutions: two reasons for Sicilian backwardness?|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
|Depositing User:||Andrea Consoli|
|Date Deposited:||21. Apr 2008 14:06|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2013 12:52|
Abrescia M., (2003) ‘Governare la differenziazione. L’analisi economica del diritto e il nuovo titolo V della Costituzione’, Mercato concorrenza regole, 1. Baranzini M e Scazzieri R. (1990) ‘Institutions in Economic Theory’, in The Economic Theory of Structure and Change, Cambridge University Press, 243-267. Barca F. et Al. (a cura di), 2006 ‘Federalismo, equità e sviluppo’, Il Mulino Bologna. Brainard, William C. and Dolbear, F. Trenery (1967), ‘The Possibility of Oversupply of Local Public Goods’, 75 Journal of Political Econonomy, 86. Breton, Albert and Scott, Anthony (1978), The Economic Constitution of Federal States, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Buchanan J. M. and Tullock G. ‘The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy’, ed. It. (1998) Il Mulino Bologna. Centorrino, M. (2004) ‘Mafia, Economia e Globalizzazione’ , Il sogno 252, 7. Coase, Ronald (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Costs’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1-44. Cooter R.D. (2000) ‘The Strategic Constitution’, Princeton Un. Press Cumberland, John (1981), ‘Efficiency and Equity in Interregional Environmental Management’, 2 Review of Regional Studies, 1. Downs A. ‘Teoria economica della democrazia’, ed. It. (1988) Il MulinoBologna. Easterbrook, Frank (1983), ‘Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism’, 26 Journal of Law & Economics, 23-50. Ellickson, Robert (1979), ‘Public Property Rights: Vicarious Intergovernmental Rights and Liabilities as a Technique for Correcting Intergovernmental Spillovers’, in Rubinfeld, Daniel (ed.), Essays on the Law and Economics of Local Governments. Epple, D. and Zelenitz, A. (1981), ‘The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?’, 89 Journal of Public Economy, 1197. Frey B.S. and Eichenberger R., (1999) ’The new democratic federalism for Europe. Overlapping and competing jurisdictions’ Northampton. Krugman P. ‘Scale economies, product differentiation and the pattern of trade’. In the American Economic Rewiew 70/V 1980. North, D.C. (1990), ‘Istitutions, Istitutional Change and Economic Performance’, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Oates, Wallace E. and Schwab, Robert M. (1986), ‘Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?’, 35 Journal of Public Economics, 333. Persson T. and Tabellini G. ‘The economic effects of constitutions’, MIT Press 2003 Posner, Richard A. (1977 (2)) (1986)(3rd, ed.), The Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, Little Brown. Posner, Richard A. (1987), The Constitution as an Economic Document, George Washington Law Review, 56 (4), pp. 4-38 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1981), ‘Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic’, 89 Journal of Political Economy, 152-165. Tiebout, (1956), ‘A pure theory of local expenditure’, Journal of Political Economy 416.