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Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem

Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem.

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Abstract

The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share guaranteed” property.

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