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Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate

Semenov, Aggey (2008): Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate. Forthcoming in: Public Choice

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Abstract

The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate's ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.

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