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Formulas for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty determination

Salant, David J (2007): Formulas for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty determination. Forthcoming in:

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Abstract

This paper takes an axiomatic approach to determining “Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory” (“FRAND”) royalties for intellectual property (“IP”) rights. Drawing on the extensive game theory literature on “surplus sharing/cost sharing” problems, I describe specific formulas for determining license fees that can be derived from basic fairness principles. In particular, I describe the Shapley Value, the Proportional Sharing Rule and the Nucleolus. The Proportional Sharing Rule has the advantage that it is the only rule that is invariant to mergers and splitting of the IP owners. I also explain why, at times, there may be no acceptable to solution. Further, I contrast these rules with the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (“ECPR”) suggested by Baumol and Swanson. Unlike, the ECPR, the rules identified in this paper can uniquely determine license fees when there is more than one owner of essential IP, and also incorporate various notions of fairness and equity.

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