Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.
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In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Three-sided matchings and separable preferences|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory|
|Depositing User:||Somdeb Lahiri|
|Date Deposited:||08. May 2008 06:42|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 15:54|
1.Alkan, A., 1988. Non-existence of stable threesome matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences, 16, 207-209. 2.Danilov, F.I., 2003. Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 145 -148. 3.Gale, D., Shapley, L.S., 1962. College admission and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69,9-14. 4.Lahiri, S., 2006. Pair-wise stability in two-sided matching problems with quotas. (mimeo). 5.Roth, A. E. and Sotomayor, M., 1990. Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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