Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.
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Abstract
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Three-sided matchings and separable preferences |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory |
| Item ID: | 8660 |
| Depositing User: | Somdeb Lahiri |
| Date Deposited: | 08. May 2008 06:42 |
| Last Modified: | 16. Feb 2013 15:54 |
| References: | 1.Alkan, A., 1988. Non-existence of stable threesome matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences, 16, 207-209. 2.Danilov, F.I., 2003. Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 145 -148. 3.Gale, D., Shapley, L.S., 1962. College admission and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69,9-14. 4.Lahiri, S., 2006. Pair-wise stability in two-sided matching problems with quotas. (mimeo). 5.Roth, A. E. and Sotomayor, M., 1990. Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. |
| URI: | http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/8660 |
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