Chen, Zhijun (2006): Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design.
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This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer. We relax the restriction of publicly enforced grand contract in the framework of Laffont-Martimort-Itoh, which allows us to incorporate the approach of private enforcement into the theory. In a setting of moral hazard with mutually observable actions, we develop a multi-stage mechanism integrated with secret reporting and private transferring and show that the first-best allocation can be implememted in spite of collusion, which implies that preventing collusion entails no cost under new approach.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||School of Economics, Zhejiang University|
|Original Title:||Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design|
|Keywords:||secret report; private enforcement; collusion-proof mechanism design|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
|Depositing User:||Zhijun Chen|
|Date Deposited:||18. Nov 2006|
|Last Modified:||26. Feb 2013 05:28|
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