Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.
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In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Three-sided matchings and separable preferences|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory|
|Depositing User:||Somdeb Lahiri|
|Date Deposited:||26. May 2008 08:15|
|Last Modified:||25. Feb 2013 18:22|
1.Alkan, A., 1988. Non-existence of stable threesome matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences, 16, 207-209. 2.Boros, E., Gurvich, V., Jaslar, S. and Krasner, D., 2004. Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences. Discrete Mathematics, 286, 1-10. 3.Danilov, F.I., 2003. Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 145 -148. 4.Eriksson, K., Sjonstrand, J., Strimling, P., 2006. Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclical preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences 52, 77-87. 5.Gale, D., Shapley, L.S., 1962. College admission and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-14. 6.Lahiri, S., 2006. Pair-wise stability in two-sided matching problems with quotas. (mimeo). 7. Roth, A. E. and Sotomayor, M., 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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Three-sided matchings and separable preferences. (deposited 08. May 2008 06:42)
- Three-sided matchings and separable preferences. (deposited 26. May 2008 08:15) [Currently Displayed]