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Assimetria de Informações e Pagamento de Dividendos na Bovespa

Iquiapaza, Robert and Lamounier, Wagner and Amaral, Hudson (2006): Assimetria de Informações e Pagamento de Dividendos na Bovespa. Published in: Advances in Scientific and Applied Accounting , Vol. 1, No. 1 (15. June 2008): pp. 1-14.

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Abstract

The aim of this research was to evaluate the effect of the asymmetric information, the agency costs, and the property structure in the determination of the dividend payments, in a sample of 178 open companies quoted at Bovespa. The analyzed period was between 2000 and 2004. The Tobit regression model was used in order to handle the fact that the payout is censured at zero. It was verified that companies with ADRs quoted at NYSE, a proxy for smaller asymmetric information, pay less dividends, which is in line with the signaling hypothesis. After controlling by asymmetric information, the property concentration by the controller (insider) presented a negative relationship with the dividends payment. Lastly, it was found a negative relationship of the dividend payments with opportunities of growth and positive with the cash flow, as foreseen by the pecking order hypothesis.

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