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Feeding Terror! How Bin Laden Rewards Terrorist Groups, An Economic Interpretation.

Caruso, Raul and Locatelli, Andrea (2007): Feeding Terror! How Bin Laden Rewards Terrorist Groups, An Economic Interpretation.

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Abstract

The aim of this brief paper is to interpret al Qaeda’s modus operandi in the light of the economic theory of contests. The main idea expressed here is that al Qaeda can be considered as a contest-designer rewarding an indivisible prize. Affiliated groups compete with each other to win the prize. The argument is discussed and some tentative policy prescriptions are presented.

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