Gillies, Anthony S and Rigdon, Mary L (2008): Epistemic Conditions and Social Preferences in Trust Games.
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It is well-known that subjects in bilateral bargaining experiments often exhibit choice behavior suggesting there are strong reciprocators in the population. But it is controversial whether explaining this data requires a social preference model that invokes genuine strong reciprocity or whether some social preference model built on other-regarding preferences as a surrogate can explain it. Since the data precedes theory here, all the social preference models agree on most of it — making direct tests more diﬃcult. We report results from a laboratory experiment using a novel method for testing between the classes of social preference models in the trust game that manipulates the distribution of payoﬀ information in the game. We ﬁnd evidence supporting the strong reciprocity hypothesis.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Epistemic Conditions and Social Preferences in Trust Games|
|Keywords:||social preferences, trust game, reciprocity, strong reciprocators|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
|Depositing User:||Mary Rigdon|
|Date Deposited:||19. Jul 2008 08:26|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 23:33|
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