Review of Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", with a reaction, also on its relevance in 2008 for the European Union

Colignatus, Thomas (2008): Review of Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", with a reaction, also on its relevance in 2008 for the European Union. Unpublished.

Abstract

There will be many researchers who discover voting theory afresh and who will want to understand it and its interesting paradoxes. Arrow's theorem (1951, 1963) is the most celebrated result in social choice theory. It has been criticized a lot but Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", is a monograph that actually succeeds. The booklet has received insufficient attention in the literature. This review also compares DeLong’s approach with my own book "Voting theory for democracy" (2007) and comments on the relevance in 2008 for the European Union, with respect to the veto power of its Member States and their citizens.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics
• Language: English
• Keywords: voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; Borda Fixed Point; democracy; European Union; Arrow's theorem
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economics Education and Teaching of Economics; H - Public Economics > H0 - General

References

Thomas Colignatus is the preferred name of Thomas Cool in science.

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