Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Note on the Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

Sun, Ching-jen (2007): A Note on the Dynamics of Incentive Contracts.

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Abstract

Laffont and Tirole [3] show that when the uncertainty about the agent's ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling, but it is not necessary to be a partition equilibrium. They construct a nonpartition continuation equilibrium for a given first-period menu of contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty. We show that, irrespective of the amount of uncertainty, this nonpartition continuation equilibrium generates a smaller payoff for the principal than a different menu of contracts with a partition continuation equilibrium. In this sense, Laffont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal. An intuition behind this result is provided that may shed some light on the problem of dynamic contracting without commitment.

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