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Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed

Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John and Zhou, Jidong (2008): Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed. Unpublished.

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Abstract

We discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumer incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market. In a market with costly consumer search, we find that imposing a cap on suppliers' prices reduces the incentive to engage in search, with the result that prices paid by consumers (both informed and uninformed) may rise. In a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing, we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Keywords:Consumer protection; search; price caps; advertising
Subjects:D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D18 - Consumer Protection
L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
ID Code:9898
Deposited By:Mark Armstrong
Deposited On:07. Aug 2008 13:48
Last Modified:07. Aug 2008 13:48
References:

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