Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John and Zhou, Jidong (2008): Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed.
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Abstract
We discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumer incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market. In a market with costly consumer search, we find that imposing a cap on suppliers' prices reduces the incentive to engage in search, with the result that prices paid by consumers (both informed and uninformed) may rise. In a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing, we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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| Original Title: | Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Consumer protection; search; price caps; advertising |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D18 - Consumer Protection L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Item ID: | 9898 |
| Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
| Date Deposited: | 07. Aug 2008 11:48 |
| Last Modified: | 18. Feb 2013 23:54 |
| URI: | http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/9898 |


