Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Licensing probabilistic Patents: The duopoly case.

Vargas Barrenechea, Martin (2008): Licensing probabilistic Patents: The duopoly case.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_9925.pdf

Download (119Kb) | Preview

Abstract

In this work we study licensing games of non drastic innovations under the shadow of probabilistic patents. We study the situation of a insider innovator that get a new reduction cost innovation and acts in a duopoly market under Cournout competition. When the property rights are not ironclad the potential licensee additional to the option of use the backstop technology instead of the new technology ,has the option of infringe the patent. Under infringement the patent holder can sue the infringer in a court and if its successful could get a order of damages payment. Then when the infringer decides about what kind of technology to use the infringement is always better than to use the backstop technology then a difference of the ironclad licensing games probabilistic rights, change the threats points and makes attractive for the patent holder just to license big innovations under the Lost Profit rule.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.