Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Spatial Pillage Game

Jung, Hanjoon Michael / HM (2007): Spatial Pillage Game.

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Abstract

A pillage game is a coalitional game as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game. Players are located in regions and can travel from one region to another. The players can form a coalition and combine their power only within their destination regions, which limits the exertion of the power of each coalition. Under this spatial restriction, a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation that defines stable states in which powers among the players are endogenously balanced. With the spatial restriction, the set of stable states changes. However, if the players have forecasting ability, then the set of stable states does not change with the spatial restriction. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.

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