?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=https%3A%2F%2Fmpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de%2F2007%2F&rft.title=Trust+and+reciprocity+in+incentive+contracting&rft.creator=Rigdon%2C+Mary&rft.subject=D01+-+Microeconomic+Behavior%3A+Underlying+Principles&rft.subject=D02+-+Institutions%3A+Design%2C+Formation%2C+Operations%2C+and+Impact&rft.subject=D00+-+General&rft.description=Principals+can+attempt+to+get+agents+to+perform+certain+actions+preferable+to+the+principal+by+using+ex+post+punishments+or+rewards+to+align+incentives.++Field+data+is+mixed+on+whether%2C+and+to+what+extent%2C+such+informal+incentive+contracting+(paradoxically)+crowds+out+efficient+solutions+to+the+agency+problem.++This+paper+explores%2C+via+a+novel+set+of+laboratory+experiments%2C+the+impact+of+ex+post+incentives+on+informal+contracts+between+principals+and+agents+in+bargaining+environments+in+which+there+are+gains+from+exchange+and+when+there+is+an+opportunity+for+the+principal+to+relay+a+no-cost+demand+of+the+division+of+those+gains.++Incentive+contracting+in+these+environments+does+not+crowd-out+off-equilibrium+cooperation%2C+and+at+high+incentive+levels+cooperation+is+crowded+in.&rft.date=2005-05&rft.type=MPRA+Paper&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fmpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de%2F2007%2F1%2FMPRA_paper_2007.pdf&rft.identifier=++Rigdon%2C+Mary++(2005)%3A+Trust+and+reciprocity+in+incentive+contracting.++++&rft.language=en