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        <dc:title>Manipulation in oligopoly</dc:title>
        <dc:creator>Corchon, Luis</dc:creator>
        <dc:creator>Silva, Jose Luis</dc:creator>
        <dc:subject>L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects</dc:subject>
        <dc:description>The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results obtained by Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) allowing for non-linear demand functions, many players and general attitudes to the risk by the players. We also generalize their set-up by introducing a more general measure of th aggresivity of players in the second stage of the game.</dc:description>
        <dc:date>1994</dc:date>
        <dc:type>MPRA Paper</dc:type>
        <dc:type>NonPeerReviewed</dc:type>
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        <dc:language>en</dc:language>
        <dc:identifier>https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20073/1/MPRA_paper_20073.pdf</dc:identifier>
        <dc:identifier>  Corchon, Luis and Silva, Jose Luis  (1994): Manipulation in oligopoly.    </dc:identifier>
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