https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/28168 2019-09-28T16:43:42Z info:eu-repo/semantics/descriptiveMetadata https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28168/ Existence of a Pareto optimal social interaction outcome with non-binary preferences Berdellima, Arian Naqvi, Nadeem D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles D60 - General We prove the existence of a Pareto optimal state of a society with non-binary personal preferences. To our knowledge, this is the weakest set of conditions under which the existence of a Pareto optimal state has been proven. In our theory everybody in society engages in maximization as a personal act of volitional choice based on non-binary preferences, as in Sen (1997). The resultant equilibrium belongs to a unanimity-based nonempty social maximal set. Our generalization exposes the fact that such equilibria support discrimination, which is a surprising, though serious, indictment of relying exclusively on the Pareto principle in social evaluation. 2011-01-13 MPRA Paper NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28168/1/MPRA_paper_28168.pdf Berdellima, Arian and Naqvi, Nadeem (2011): Existence of a Pareto optimal social interaction outcome with non-binary preferences. en info:eu-repo/semantics/objectFile info:eu-repo/semantics/humanStartPage