relation: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/
title: Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets
creator: Koray, Semih
creator: Saglam, Ismail
subject: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
subject: D70 - General
subject: L50 - General
description: We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.
date: 1997
type: MPRA Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
language: en
identifier: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/1/MPRA_paper_4459.pdf
identifier:   Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail  (1997): Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets.    
language: en