https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/4459 2019-10-05T00:11:45Z info:eu-repo/semantics/descriptiveMetadata https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/ Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets Koray, Semih Saglam, Ismail D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design D70 - General L50 - General We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable. 1997 MPRA Paper NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/1/MPRA_paper_4459.pdf Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (1997): Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets. en info:eu-repo/semantics/objectFile info:eu-repo/semantics/humanStartPage