eprintid: 4459
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 720
dir: disk0/00/00/44/59
datestamp: 2007-08-13
lastmod: 2019-10-05 00:11:45
status_changed: 2007-11-07 02:56:49
type: paper
metadata_visibility: show
abstract: We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.
copyrightnote: I certify that I have the right to deposit the contribution with MPRA.
creators_name: Koray, Semih
creators_name: Saglam, Ismail
creators_id: 
creators_id: saglamis@boun.edu.tr
date: 1997
date_issue: 1997
file_format: pdf
file_url: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/01/MPRA_paper_4459.pdf
full_text_status: public
identifierabstract: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/
institutions: Bilkent University
institution: Bilkent University
ispublished: unpub
keywords: Bayesian Implementation; Nash Implementation; Asymmetric Information; Oligopoly; Regulation
language: en
pages: 17
subjects: D82
subjects: D70
subjects: L50
title: Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets
citation:   Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail  (1997): Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets.    
document_url: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/1/MPRA_paper_4459.pdf