?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=https%3A%2F%2Fmpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de%2F8379%2F&rft.title=The+Value+of+Rents+and+the+Likelihood+of+Conflicts&rft.creator=Bennour%2C+Khaled&rft.subject=D74+-+Conflict+%3B+Conflict+Resolution+%3B+Alliances+%3B+Revolutions&rft.description=This+paper+extends+the+prey--predator+model+of+Grossman+and+Kim+(1995)+to+analyze+the+relation+between+the+value+of+the+contested+rent+and+the+emergence+of+a+conflict.+We+show+that+an+increase+in+the+value+of+the+rent+makes+the+conflict+equilibrium+more+likely.+We+also+analyze+the+case+where+the+valuation+of+the+rent+is+different+for+the+two+players.+We+find%2C+for+example%2C+that+a+conflict+equilibrium+may+occur+even+though+the+predator+has+an+important+disadvantage+in+warfare.+That's+when+its+valuation+of+the+rent+is+sufficiently+high+compare+to+that+of+the+prey.&rft.date=2008-04&rft.type=MPRA+Paper&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fmpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de%2F8379%2F1%2FMPRA_paper_8379.pdf&rft.identifier=++Bennour%2C+Khaled++(2008)%3A+The+Value+of+Rents+and+the+Likelihood+of+Conflicts.++++&rft.language=en