The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence

DeVaro, Jed and Waldman, Michael (2006): The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence.

Abstract

An extensive theoretical literature has developed that investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. There have been no tests, however, of the empirical validity of this idea. In this paper we develop the theory in a manner that allows us to generate testable predictions, and then investigate the validity of these predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal-labor-market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry. Our results support the notion that signaling is both a statistically significant and economically significant factor in promotion decisions. The paper also contributes to the extensive literature on the role of education as a labor-market signal.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Cornell University
• Language: English
• Keywords: signaling theory; promotions; asymmetric information
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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