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Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria

Oyama, Daisuke and Tercieux, Olivier (2004): Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria.

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Abstract

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris, Econometrica 65 (1997)) and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 (1995)). Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided.

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