A Reform Proposal for EMU Institutions

Lossani, Marco and Natale, Piergiovanna and Tirelli, Patrizio (2001): A Reform Proposal for EMU Institutions. Published in: Ifo studien (2002)

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss a reform proposal for EMU macroeconomic institutions which rests on the generalised adoption of targets, for both monetary and fiscal policies, to be integrated by a system of checks and balances. The new arrangements for fiscal policies should induce EMU countries to internalise the external effects of their own policies, therefore allowing a partial relaxation of the SGP limits to national debt policies. As for monetary policy, we propose the adoption of an inflation target, the assignment of ex-post assessing powers to the Euro12-group and an internal reform of the ECB. The latter should limit undue nationalistic influences within the ECB governing bodies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: EMU, Institutional design
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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