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Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2011): Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference.

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Abstract

We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections from the best response correspondences need not exist.

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