Please don’t vote for me: strategic voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives

Spenkuch, Jörg L. (2012): Please don’t vote for me: strategic voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives.

Abstract

Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. Exploiting a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may gain seats by receiving fewer votes, this paper documents patterns of strategic voting in a large, real world election. During the 2005 elections to the Bundestag, the sudden death of a right-wing candidate necessitated a by-election in one electoral district. Knowing the results in all other districts and aware of the paradoxical incentives in place, a substantial fraction of the electorate reacted tactically and either voted for a party other than their most preferred one, or abstained. As a result, the Christian Democratic Union won an additional mandate, extending its narrow lead over the Social Democrats.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: voting; strategic voting; manipulation of elections
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

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