Armstrong, Mark (2006): Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post.
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Abstract
An incumbent postal service provider faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of significant fixed costs, require retail prices to be out of line with underlying marginal costs. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple framework, this note analyses how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Access pricing; post; regulation; liberalisation |
| Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L87 - Postal and Delivery Services L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation |
| Item ID: | 62 |
| Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Oct 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Oct 2019 20:38 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/62 |
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